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Fairness Opinions
Abstract
This Article re-examines the fairness opinion, as well as its role and necessity in corporate control transactions.
This Article argues that today's fairness opinion regime is deeply flawed and, as a consequence, a fairness
opinion has little meaning. The reasons are primarily this: the financial analyses underlying fairness opinions,
as currently prepared by investment banks, are prone to excessive subjectivity and are frequently the product
of valuation techniques that are not in accord with best practices. These defects are exacerbated by the
recurring problem of these same investment banks who are conflicted in their provision of these opinions.
Meanwhile, SEC and FINRA regulation of fairness opinions does not adequately address these fundamental
issues while the Delaware courts continue to periodically reassert, without question, Smith v. Van Gorkom's
implicit fairness opinion requirement, thereby bestowing excessive significance to the fairness opinion. This
Article, though, does not call for the fairness opinion's death. Rather, I argue that the fairness opinion regime
should be reformed through a quasi-public, standard-setting body. Creation of this body and its adoption of
standards and guidelines for preparation of a fairness opinion and its undergirding financial analyses, as well as
heightened disclosure requirements, should enhance the economics and usefulness of the fairness opinion by
reducing subjectivity in valuation, ensuring proper grounding and permitting increased market scrutiny.
Implementation of these reforms would also do more to alleviate the related and repeatedly cited problem of
investment bank conflicts of interest than prior disclosure-based and other proposals. If these reforms are
adopted, the fairness opinion, in and of itself, is still not a panacea. It will always be an inferior substitute for a
market-based approach to determine the fairness of the consideration in a corporate control transaction.
However, a valuation conducted with rigor and in accordance with disclosed standards and guidelines can
inform materially as to value when a market-based price is unavailable or unobtainable. In such a context, a
fairness opinion can have meaning. Even in such situations, though, the inherent limitations of state-of-the-art
valuation should be recognized; a fairness opinion should only be one of many tools to assist a board in
gauging what is a fair price. The Delaware courts should recognize this, repudiating Van Gorkom's wholesale,
implicit fairness opinion requirement when the agreed price is a market-based one. In other circumstances, a
fairness opinion should not be required, but if received, should be considered by the Delaware courts as only
one indicative factor to be utilized in assessing a board's satisfaction of its duty of care.
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INTRODUCTION 
A fairness opinion is an opinion provided by an outside advisor, 
usually, though not necessarily, an investment bank, that a 
transaction meets a threshold level of fairness from a financial 
perspective.  Typically, these opinions are rendered to a 
corporation’s board of directors, or a committee thereof, in 
connection with a corporate control transaction such as a sale, 
leveraged buy-out,1 leveraged recapitalization,2 going-private 
transaction,3 or otherwise.4  The board will rely on this opinion to 
                                                          
 1. A leveraged buy-out is the acquisition for cash of the outstanding stock of a 
publicly traded corporation.  The cash consideration is principally obtained through 
debt financing secured by the assets of the acquired corporation.  See generally Tom 
Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buy-outs:  The Ever Changing Landscape, 13 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 109-14 (2000/2001) (discussing the history and parameters of 
leveraged buy-outs in the United States); Bill Shaw & Edward J. Gac, Fairness Opinions 
in Leveraged Buy-outs:   Should Investment Bankers Be Directly Liable to Shareholders?, 23 
SEC. REG. L.J. 293 (1995) (discussing the use of fairness opinions in leveraged buy-
outs). 
 2. A leveraged recapitalization is similar to a leveraged buy-out except that, in 
addition to cash consideration for their shares, the public stockholders of the 
corporation receive equity in the post-transaction, leveraged corporation.  See 
generally Franci J. Blassberg & Peter J. Shabecoff, Structuring Issues for Financial 
Sponsors in Leveraged Recapitalization Transactions, in 2 ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE 
PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2004, at 371 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Series No. B-1432, 2004) (discussing the structure of a leveraged recapitalization).  
The public stockholders retain a smaller aggregate interest in the equity of the 
corporation with the remaining equity held by the arranging participants of the 
recapitalization, typically management or a financial sponsor.  Id. 
 3. A going-private transaction can be defined as one where an affiliate of a 
publicly held corporation (e.g., a member of management or a controlling 
stockholder) acquires the remaining corporate equity.  Consequently, the 
corporation becomes “private,” and its equity is no longer publicly traded.  See also 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2001) (setting forth the federal securities law definition of a 
going-private transaction).  See generally Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Revisiting 
Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma Post—Pure Resources, 59 BUS. LAW. 1459 (2004) 
(discussing recent Delaware case law with respect to going-private transactions); 
Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions:  A Practitioner’s 
Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005) (describing the legal regulation of going-private 
transactions). 
 4. Corporate control transactions can also be defined as those fulfilling the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) definition of a takeover set forth in 
Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006), promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, 
as amended (the “Securities Act”).  15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).  Rule 145 sets 
forth the federal securities law definition of a takeover transaction for purposes of an 
offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sale under the Securities Act when “there is 
submitted to security holders a plan or agreement pursuant to which such holders 
are required to elect, on the basis of what is in substance a new investment decision, 
whether to accept a new or different security in exchange for their existing security.”  
17 C.F.R. § 230.145, preliminary note (2006).  This is an overly broad definition for a 
corporate control transaction since it encompasses merger transactions that do not 
constitute a change of control for either party.  The definition is also narrow since it 
excludes transactions that do not involve securities consideration.  A corporate 
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satisfy its duty of care in the determination of whether or not to 
proceed.5  There are other paradigms in which fairness opinions are 
utilized; however, the thrust of this Article is focused upon the use of 
such opinions by acquirees in a corporate control transaction.6 
In the mid-1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom7 placed heavy reliance on the lack of a fairness opinion or 
other reliable valuation in a corporate control transaction to sustain a 
holding that an acquiree board breached its duty of care.8  From this 
                                                          
control transaction for purposes of this Article can be simply defined as a 
transaction, or series of related transactions, which constitute a transfer of control of 
a corporation or all, or substantially all, of its assets. 
 5. A board is subject under Delaware law to a fiduciary duty of care.  In a 
corporate control transaction, this requires the board to “inform themselves fully and 
in a deliberate manner before voting” on a corporate control transaction.  Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)).  This more specifically obligates a board to apprise 
itself “of all material information reasonably available to them.”  Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 858, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 716 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).  A plaintiff asserting a breach of this 
duty of care must establish that the board was grossly negligent in the referenced 
decision.  Id. at 873.  Simple negligence is insufficient.  Id.  A failure to establish gross 
negligence when asserting a breach of the duty of care will lead the Delaware courts 
to apply the business judgment rule; consequently, the courts will not second guess 
this business decision.  See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.  See generally Craig W. Palm & Mark 
A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in Delaware:   The Rules of the Game 
(Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1307-08 (1995) (outlining the duty of care and the 
standard for breach thereof under Delaware law).  To date, Van Gorkom is the leading 
Delaware case on the duty of care in the corporate control context.  See discussion of 
case and its holding infra Part I.B; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 
2006 WL 1562466 (Del. 2006) (discussing scope of duty of care and the board 
decision-making process outside of the corporate control context). 
 6. Fairness opinions are also utilized in other corporate transactions to assist a 
board in setting price when conflicts of interest arguably exist, which require such 
additional aid or when a general need for information as to value is desirable.  For 
example, fairness opinions are routinely provided in connection with split-offs and 
spin-offs.  See, e.g., Rosser v. New Valley Corp., 2005 WL 1364624, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (fairness opinion obtained in connection with recapitalization); Gen. Motors, 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at E-2 (Aug. 21, 2003) (four fairness 
opinions obtained in connection with the split-off of Hughes Electronics by General 
Motors); see also Thomas Patrick Dore, Jr. & Peter Pattison, Fairness Opinions in 
Corporate Real Estate Transactions, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 2002, at 4 (advocating use of 
fairness opinions in real estate transactions).  However, the primary use of fairness 
opinions today is within the corporate control transaction.  See generally Charles M. 
Elson et al., Fairness Opinions—Can They Be Made Useful?, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 
1984 (Nov. 24, 2003) (setting forth illustrative corporate transactions wherein 
fairness opinions are typically rendered) [hereinafter Elson, Can They Be Made 
Useful?].   
 7. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 8. See discussion of case and its holding infra at Part I.B.  Corporate law in the 
United States is principally set by state law applied to a corporation based on its situs 
of incorporation.  This Article focuses primarily on the general corporate law of 
Delaware when discussing state law and applicable governing corporate law.  This is 
because Delaware is the principal and preferred place of incorporation for the 
majority of public corporations in the United States and is viewed as the national 
standard-setter for regulation of public corporations.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
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singular act, academics and practitioners inferred and concluded, 
perhaps rightfully, that a fairness opinion was a virtually mandatory 
requirement for an acquiree board, or committee thereof, making a 
corporate control decision.9  This was their practical conclusion.  
However, their critical response was heated, almost visceral in nature.  
Immediately after Van Gorkom and through the early 1990s, fairness 
opinions were derided as, among other things, conflict-ridden, 
subjective, rubber-stamps, meaningless, and hackneyed.10  This burst 
of criticism dissipated as the Delaware courts continued to place 
                                                          
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:  Reconsidering the Competition over 
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002) (stating Delaware “plays a central role 
in setting corporate governance rules for the nation’s publicly traded companies”); 
Website of Delaware Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/ (last 
visited May 27, 2006) (noting that “more than 50% of all U.S. publicly traded 
companies and 60% of the Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware).  For this 
reason, and Delaware’s perceived, well-qualified judiciary, Delaware courts regularly 
address major corporate law issues facing publicly traded corporations, and Delaware 
is therefore generally regarded to have the most trenchant case law.  See E. Norman 
Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and 
Governance From 1992-2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1399, 1399-1411 (2005) (discussing the primacy of Delaware case-law in addressing 
corporate governance and related issues). 
 9. E.g., Michael J. Kennedy, Functional Fairness—The Mechanics, Functions and 
Liabilities of Fairness Opinions, in HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A COOLING MARKET:   
ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE, at 605, 607 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. B-1255, 2001) (noting that fairness opinions are delivered “in 
almost any transaction of note involving public companies”); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985) 
(asserting that after Van Gorkom, “no firm considering a fundamental corporate 
change will do so without obtaining a fairness letter”); Shaw & Gac, supra note 1, at 
293 (“Over the last decade, the fairness opinion has become a necessary and integral 
aspect of every major corporate control transaction.”); Andre Ross Sorkin, A Dual 
Role for Lehman in Deal Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at C1 (noting as unusual the 
lack of a fairness opinion in the proposed transaction). 
 10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions:   How Fair 
Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 29-38 (1989) (discussing 
the substantial preparer discretion with respect to a fairness opinion) [hereinafter 
Elson, Are They Fair]; William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions:  How Fair Are They and Why 
We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 532-37 (1992) (criticizing 
fairness opinions for lack of precision and inability to predict price); Charles M. 
Elson, Fairness Opinions:   Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951, 952-70 
(1992) (criticizing fairness opinions for having “dubious” value); Michael W. Martin, 
Note, Fairness Opinions and Negligent Misrepresentation:   Defining Investment Bankers’ 
Duty to Third-Party Shareholders, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 133, 140-41 (1991) (“[D]uring the 
mergers-and-acquisitions boom of the 1980s, the rendering of a fairness opinion 
became a mere formality performed after a deal was structured.”); Dale Arthur 
Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts:  Creating or Appropriating Shareholder 
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 214 (1988) (“[T]he chicanery of using made-to-order 
fairness opinions is probably widespread.”); see also Bernard Black & Reinier 
Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law:   The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 521, 555-57 (2002) (criticizing fairness opinions for their “doubtful” value); 
Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6, at 2-3 (discussing various criticisms of 
investment bank fairness opinions); David Henry, A Fair Deal—But for Whom?, BUS. 
WK., Nov. 24, 2003, at 108 (criticizing investment banks rendering fairness opinions 
for lack of objectivity and conflicts of interest). 
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persuasive reliance on fairness opinions and intermittently reasserted 
their implicit requirement for an acquiree fairness opinion in a 
corporate control transaction.11  Today, the fairness opinion survives 
and thrives, earning investment banks millions, if not billions, of 
dollars yearly.12 
This Article re-examines the fairness opinion, as well as its role and 
necessity.  Corporate law and regulation, as well as attitudes with 
respect thereto, have advanced from the hallmark time of Van 
Gorkom.13  Finance, a young discipline, has also progressed markedly, 
and previously held assumptions and methodologies have been 
rejected, refined, or revised.14  This Article also analyzes the fairness 
opinion in light of these developments in law and finance.15  I 
                                                          
 11. See infra notes 219-226 and accompanying text. 
 12. One recent empirical study analyzed a significant sample of merger and 
acquisition transactions announced between 1994 and 2003 and found that a fairness 
opinion had been provided to approximately eighty percent of acquirees and thirty-
seven percent of acquirers.  See Darren J. Kisgen et al., Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The 
Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=901475; see also Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business 
Judgment Rule:   An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 567, 577-78 (2002) (detailing an empirical study which found that 
approximately sixty-one percent of acquiree firms in selected, post-Van Gorkom 
corporate control transactions reported receipt of a fairness opinion, while over 
ninety percent of firms during this period disclosed that they had engaged a 
financial advisor for the transaction). 
 13. This is particularly true in the post-Enron/Worldcom universe.  For a 
discussion of this heightened scrutiny of corporate actions and increased regulation 
of corporations post-Enron/Worldcom, see, inter alia, William B. Chandler III & Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:   
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) 
(discussing possible corporate governance and regulatory reforms in the 21st 
century); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law:   Enron, 
Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (tracing the 
development of post-Enron/Worldcom reforms and arguing for increased legal 
corporate reform based on core American values of equality and meritocracy); 
Gretchen Morgenson, An Emboldened Investor Class Is Not Likely to Go Away Soon, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at C1 (reporting increased supervision of corporate practices by 
stockholders post-Enron/Worldcom). 
 14. For a history of these developments, see generally JONATHON BARRON BASKIN & 
PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1997); RICHARD A. BREALEY & 
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, at 995-98 (7th Int’l ed. 2003); 
SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS 4-18 (4th ed. 2000). 
 15. Criticism and review of the fairness opinion has, in recent years, percolated 
into the public realm.  Elliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the state of New York, 
stated publicly in 2003 that an inquiry should be made of investment bank fairness 
opinion practices.  To date, though, his office has not taken any public action.  See 
Patrick J. Leddy & Randall M. Walters, The Growing Storm over Fairness Opinions, 
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Mar. 2005, at 35-36.  Additionally, there has been a 
recent investigation into fairness opinion practices by the Massachusetts Secretary of 
the Commonwealth and regulatory action by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (“NASD”).  The investigation of the Massachusetts Secretary of the 
Commonwealth is discussed infra note 164 and accompanying text.  The new 
proposed NASD regulation is discussed infra at Part III.B.  See also Ann Davis, Wall 
Street’s ‘Fairness Opinions’ Draw Fire from Calpers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2005, at C1 
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conclude that current fairness opinion practice is still deeply flawed.  
Fairness opinions, and their underlying valuation analyses, are prone 
to subjectivity and are frequently prepared utilizing methodologies 
that simply do not jibe with best practices.16  These defects are 
exacerbated by the recurring problem of investment banks who are 
conflicted in their provision of fairness opinions.17 
This Article, however, does not call for the fairness opinion’s 
death.  Rather, I argue for a conditioned place in corporate control 
transactions, albeit legally diminished, for the fairness opinion.  The 
pre-condition is the remedy of current defects through revision in the 
practice and requirements of fairness opinion preparation, form, and 
disclosure.  These suggested reforms should be implemented in a 
practical manner through a quasi-public, standard-setting body.  
Creation of this body and adoption of guidelines and standards, 
should also reduce the subjectivity and increase the reliability of 
fairness opinions enhancing their signaling, screening and 
informational qualities.  Implementation of these reforms would also 
do more to alleviate the related and repeatedly cited problem of 
investment bank conflicts-of-interest than prior disclosure-based 
proposals.18 
Even if these proposals are adopted, the fairness opinion, in and of 
itself, is not a panacea.  For two reasons, it will always be an inferior 
substitute for a market-based approach to determine the fairness of 
the consideration in a corporate control transaction.  First, valuation 
analysis, even if disciplined, can only inform as to value.  It will never 
definitively predict price—only the market can do this.  Second, a fair 
price from the acquiree stockholder perspective is one that is set 
through an effective market-based process.  Accordingly, a fairness 
opinion in a corporate control transaction, from the perspective of 
the acquiree’s stockholders, could arguably be defined as an opinion 
that an offered price is within a minimum range that otherwise would 
have been obtained in such a market-based process.19  A fairness 
opinion becomes redundant, at best, if such process is adhered to, 
                                                          
(reporting that the California Public Employees Retirement System is now 
recommending that investment banks be prohibited from issuing fairness opinions 
when also providing general financial advice). 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 19. Cf. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that some consider fair 
price in a corporate control transaction to be the price that acquiree stockholders 
would receive through an auction-process). 
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and a reformed fairness opinion will always be an imperfect substitute 
for an effective market-based price.  
However, a valuation conducted with rigor and in accordance with 
disclosed guidelines and standards can materially inform as to value.  
It is for this reason that, provided reform comes, a fairness opinion, 
and its underlying valuation analyses, can still have utility whenever 
an effective market-based price is unobtainable.  In such 
circumstances, a fairness opinion can inform the board in satisfaction 
of its duty of care by providing confidence that the consideration 
offered is commensurate with a minimum price range achievable in 
the functioning market.  Even in such situations, though, the 
inherent limitations of state-of-the-art valuation should be 
recognized; a fairness opinion should only be one of many tools to 
assist a board in gauging what is a “fair” price.  The Delaware courts 
should recognize this, repudiating Van Gorkom’s wholesale, implicit 
fairness opinion requirement when the agreed price is a market-
based one.  In other circumstances, a fairness opinion should not be 
required, but if received, it should be considered by the Delaware 
courts as only one indicative factor used to assess a board’s 
satisfaction of its duty of care. 20         
Part I of this Article examines the fairness opinion; its scope, 
purpose, form and judicially-spurred adoption.  Part II discusses the 
perceived flaws and tension points in the reliance upon fairness 
opinions in corporate control transactions.  This Part examines the 
indeterminate qualities of valuation as well as the current 
problematical practices and conflicted status of investment banks in 
the preparation and rendering of fairness opinions.  Part III surveys 
the response of various corporate regulators, the Delaware judiciary, 
and academics to the fairness opinion and its increased utilization 
post-Van Gorkom.  Part IV proposes needed legal reform to today’s 
existent fairness opinion regime.   
 
I. RISE OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION 
A. The Fairness Opinion—Scope, Purpose, and Form 
In the corporate control transaction, a fairness opinion is typically 
provided to a board, or a committee thereof, at the time of its 
consideration of the relevant transaction.21  The fairness opinion is 
                                                          
 20. See infra Part IV.A. 
 21. This permits a board to properly assess, under its duty of care, the fairness 
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usually delivered orally at this meeting by the investment bankers in 
attendance and confirmed in a subsequent, written letter addressed 
to the board from the investment bank.22  This two or three page 
letter also sets forth the transaction terms, as well as the qualifications 
and assumptions underlying the investment bank’s fairness 
determination.23  In fact, this is the letter’s primary purpose, to 
manage and restrict the investment bank’s liability for rendering the 
opinion:  the laundry list of qualifications and assumptions is the bulk 
of the text.24  It is only at the letter’s end, in one sentence, wherein 
                                                          
opinion and any related information at or before the time of its decision to enter 
into a corporate control transaction.  Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 
(Del. 1985) (holding that Trans Union’s Board was grossly negligent because it failed 
to act with informed deliberation before agreeing to a corporate control 
transaction).  However, fairness opinions are sometimes rendered after the board’s 
decision and corporation’s agreement to enter into the transaction.  See Andrew L. 
Bab, Collins and the Pitfalls of Post-Signing Fairness Opinions, 14 INSIGHTS 16, 17-18 
(Dec. 2000) (outlining three circumstances under which post-signing fairness 
opinions are sought:  in cases of substantial change, upon board request, and as a 
closing condition to a transaction agreement).  A fairness opinion is typically 
provided in such situations to account for changed circumstances and to revalidate 
the consideration offered.  See, e.g., Worldwide Rest. Concepts, Inc., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Form 14A), at cover page (Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Worldwide Proxy 
Statement] (disclosing that board requested its investment bank to “issue an update 
to its previously issued fairness opinion in the form of a ‘bring-down’ opinion so that 
the stockholders will have updated information available for consideration prior to 
the vote”).  Such an opinion is not necessarily a legal requirement under Delaware 
law unless the board obtains information that the previously rendered opinion is no 
longer true or otherwise cannot be maintained.  See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003 
WL 21003437, at *26 (Del. Ch. 2003) (affirming board decision not to obtain 
updated fairness opinion), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003); In re Unocal Exploration 
Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 350 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding updated fairness 
opinion not legally required since investment bank still believed transaction to be 
fair); Behrens v. United Investors Mgmt. Co., 1993 WL 400209, at *11-12 (Del. Ch. 
1993) (stating that intervening changes may require board to inquire whether 
fairness opinion has been adversely affected). 
 22. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 654-56 (discussing the fairness opinion 
preparation and board delivery process). 
 23. For recent examples of fairness opinions, see Maytag Corp., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Form 14A), at Annex B (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Maytag Proxy 
Statement] (containing the fairness opinion of Lazard Frères & Co., LLC delivered 
to the Maytag board in connection with Maytag’s proposed acquisition by Whirlpool 
Corporation for cash and securities); PeopleSoft, Inc., Amendment to 
Recommendation Statement (Form 14D9/A), at Exs. (a)(143) & (a)(144) (Dec. 15, 
2004) (containing the fairness opinions of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. and 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. delivered to the PeopleSoft board in connection with 
PeopleSoft’s acquisition by Oracle Corporation for cash); Plains Resources, Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at App. B (June 23, 2004) [hereinafter 
Plains Resources Proxy Statement] (containing the fairness opinion of Petrie 
Parkman & Co., Inc. delivered to the special committee of the Plains Resources 
board in connection with the corporation’s going-private). 
 24. See supra note 23 for examples of fairness opinions which contain this 
restrictive language and infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for a further 
discussion of these qualifications and limitations; see also Kennedy, supra note 9, at 
611-13 (discussing customary fairness opinion language). 
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the fairness of the transaction at-hand is opined to.25  In a corporate 
control transaction, this is a statement that the consideration26 paid or 
received in the transaction is “fair from a financial point of view” to a 
specified party.27  The party is dependent upon the form and posture 
of the transaction, but the opinion is typically directed to the party 
receiving or paying the transaction consideration.  For example, in an 
opinion delivered to an acquiree board considering the transfer of 
corporate control through a corporate sale, the opinion would be to 
the corporation’s selling stockholders.28 
A fairness opinion is not an appraisal.  It does not specify a set 
value or presume to be a determination of price.29  What a fairness 
opinion is, is the opinion of a financial or other advisor that a 
specified transaction is within a range of values encompassing 
financial fairness.30  A more specific definition of fairness in these 
                                                          
 25. See, e.g., Plains Resources Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at B-3. 
 26. If the transaction is structured as a stock-for-stock merger or exchange offer, 
wherein the consideration paid by the acquirer consists of securities to be exchanged 
for acquiree stock, the consideration for purposes of the opinion as to fairness would 
be the stock exchange ratio.  E.g., AT&T, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 
Annex B (May 23, 2005) [hereinafter AT&T Proxy Statement] (advising on the stock-
for-stock merger of AT&T and a wholly-owned subsidiary of SBC Communications, 
Credit Suisse First Boston LLC opined that “[a]s of the date hereof, the Exchange 
Ratio [wa]s fair, from a financial point of view, to the holders of Company Common 
Stock”). 
 27. The phrase “from a financial point of view” is not typically defined in the 
written opinion but can be put forth for its plain meaning:   financial fairness is 
assessed based on a numerical range of value.  Put another way, one practitioner 
commentator has proposed “from a financial point of view” to mean “that the bank’s 
opinion is based on numbers and manipulations and comparisons of these numbers.  
No other non-number factors . . . are taken into account.”  Kennedy, supra note 9, at 
615-16.  It has at times been proposed that the definition of fairness be expanded 
beyond a financial assessment to encompass retention and compensation 
arrangements entered into in connection with corporate control transactions. The 
rationale is to limit officer and director rent-seeking through a fairness check to 
ensure that these arrangements are not exigent.  These proposals should be rejected.  
Certainly, these and other arrangements and the real and potential problem of abuse 
are a troublesome issue in corporate control transactions.  This is not in doubt.  
However, addressing these issues through the fairness opinion regime misses the 
point of a fairness opinion and, at best, conflates the solution to the problem.  A 
fairness opinion speaks only to a price.  It can be defined as an opinion that a price is 
within a range of acceptable values.  See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text 
(discussing the limitations of a fairness opinion with respect to ascertainment of 
price).  Stockholders should evaluate the consideration paid and retention and other 
compensation arrangements separately.  Fairness opinions should opine only to 
financial fairness. 
 28. For these purposes, the opinion would be only to those stockholders who are 
unaffiliated with the acquirer.  For example, in one recent going-private transaction, 
the opinion stated that the consideration was fair, from a financial point of view, to 
the public stockholders other than the members of management who were 
stockholders and participants in the transaction and their affiliates.  See Plains 
Resources Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at App. B, B-3. 
 29. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 612. 
 30. Id. at 613; see also Yasuhiro Ohta & Kenton K. Yee, The Fairness Opinion 
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circumstances is almost never proposed or spelled out.31  In fact, the 
definition of fairness varies in context and, in each instance, is subject 
to debate among practitioners and academics.32  In a corporate 
control transaction, one definition of fairness, from an acquiree’s 
perspective, is a minimum range of values that the corporation’s 
unaffiliated stockholders would otherwise receive in a board-run 
auction process conducted in a fair, open, and equivalent manner.33  
However, the definition of fairness runs depending upon the opinee, 
as well as the transaction and its unique characteristics.34  To date, 
there is no agreed-upon standard definition among academics, 
                                                          
Puzzle:  Board Incentives, Information Asymmetry, and Bidding Strategy (May 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that acquiree fairness 
opinion ranges are a product of game theory—more specifically, a “cheap talk” game 
between the board and existing stockholders as well as future stockholders, designed 
to simultaneously convince current stockholders to support the transaction while 
talking up the price to future stockholders if the transaction fails).   
 31. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 30 (“[I]nvestment banks generally do 
not disclose which definition of fair price they have used; their fairness opinions 
simply state that prices are ‘fair from a financial point of view.’”).  In the eighties and 
early nineties, fairness opinions sometimes stated that a transaction was also 
equitable or otherwise briefly defined fairness.  E.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 
Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. 1993) (fairness opinion stated that “the financial 
terms of the [transaction] are fair and equitable”).  However, due to liability 
concerns, today it is extremely rare for an investment bank to go beyond a simple 
opinion that a proposed transaction is “fair” or “inadequate.”  See infra note 36 
(discussing the scope of liability for statements of opinion under the federal 
securities laws).  However, fairness opinions in non-U.S. transactions still sometimes 
do go farther where it may be a requirement or practice of the local jurisdiction.  
E.g., Sinopec Beijing Yanhua Petrochemical Co. Ltd, Transaction Statement (Form 
13e-3), at D-15 (Jan. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Sinopec Form 13e-3] (fairness opinion 
stated that the terms of the transaction were “fair and reasonable”). 
 32. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 30-34 (noting lack of agreement 
on the appropriate fairness standard); Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point 
of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies:   Is ‘Third Party Sale Value’ the Appropriate 
Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439 (1981); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 616-17 (discussing the 
definition of fairness). 
 33. There are, however, other definitions.  Fairness here could alternatively be 
formulated as one of the following:  the price that otherwise would be arrived at 
through independent bargaining between the acquiree and the acquirer; the 
acquiree’s liquidation value; the value of the acquiree absent any control premium, 
transaction cost-savings, synergies, or other transaction-related value; or the value of 
the sum of the acquiree’s businesses.  See generally Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, 
at 30-34 (outlining various possible definitions of fairness in a corporate control 
transaction).  One commentator has rejected all of these definitions; he defines 
fairness as simply the price that any selling stockholder is willing to accept.  Elson, Are 
They Fair, supra note 10, at 953.  However, I would suggest that an appropriate 
definition of acquiree fairness in any context, absent unusual circumstances, is the 
price that otherwise would be set in an effective market, and I would put forth an 
auction-based process as the optimal mechanism for achieving such price in a 
corporate control transaction. 
 34. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that context can influence 
the definition of fairness). 
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practitioners, or standard-setters of what fairness is in any 
circumstance.  This is startling.35 
Liability concerns have driven fairness opinion structure and form.  
Investment banks have eschewed definitional fairness, since 
elaboration provides further facts and conclusions upon which to 
challenge the validity or preparation of an opinion or to otherwise 
assert under the federal securities and other disclosure-based laws 
that it is a statement of fact rather than opinion.36  The qualification 
and assumptions are crafted responses designed in part to restrict or 
obviate court attempts to broaden the measure of review incumbent 
upon investment banks in the preparation of fairness opinions,37 as 
                                                          
 35. Cf. Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 497, 517 (1992) (“The profusion of differing concepts of value may cause both 
director and banker error.”). 
 36. An opinion will be deemed untrue for purposes of the federal securities laws 
if it is “issued without a genuine belief or reasonable basis.”  Herskowitz v. 
Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 
766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 
1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (“An opinion or prediction is actionable if there is a gross 
disparity between prediction and fact.”); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Secs. Litig., 126 
F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that “material statements of 
opinion are false only if the opinion was not sincerely held” and “[i]n the case of a 
fairness opinion, then, the plaintiff must plead with particularity why the statement 
of opinion was objectively and subjectively false”).  While Herskowitz and McKesson 
established that liability could be had for an untrue fairness opinion, as a practical 
matter, it is difficult to prove that a subjective opinion is untrue for purposes of the 
federal securities law.  See Herskowitz, 857 F.2d at 185; McKesson, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 
1265. 
 37. 
A fairness opinion, for example, will typically state that 
we have not assumed any responsibility for independent verification of any 
of the foregoing information and have relied on its being complete and 
accurate . . .  [w]e have not been requested to make, and have not made, an 
independent evaluation or appraisal of the assets or liabilities . . . of the 
[acquiree] or [acquirer], nor have we been furnished with any such 
evaluations or appraisals. 
AT&T Proxy Statement, supra note 26, at B-1, B-2.  Absent unusual circumstances or 
contradictory information, an investment bank may rely exclusively upon and 
assume, without independent verification or investigation, the accuracy of any 
information provided to it for purposes of its fairness opinion.  See MARTIN LIPTON & 
ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 8.06.5 (2005) (citing cases 
finding a duty to investigate where the investment bank had some basis to believe 
that the information provided was inaccurate or misleading).  In addition, in a 
public corporate control transaction, a corporation can put limitations upon the 
information provided to the investment bank so long as this stricture is disclosed to 
stockholders.  See Dowling v. Narangasset Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1119 
(D.R.I. 1990) (holding board limitation on the scope of information utilized by 
investment bank was required to be disclosed in proxy statement); Joseph v. Shell Oil 
Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341-42 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding corporation failed to “clearly and 
unequivocally” disclose that essential and necessary information had been withheld 
from the provider of a fairness opinion).  For a thorough discussion of other routine 
limitations and qualifications placed by investment banks in fairness opinions, see 
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 223-25; Dennis J. Block & Jonathon M. Hoff, Reliance on 
Fairness Opinions, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1994, at 5. 
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well as the scope of an investment bank’s duty to the relevant 
corporation’s stockholders.38  Even the addressee, the board, is a 
creature of liability concern.  The board, rather than stockholders, is 
the addressee in order to refute stockholder claims of reliance upon 
the opinion.39  Ultimately, while a full review of the fairness opinion 
form is beyond the scope of this Article, it can be claimed that these 
caveats and omissions eat up much of the worth of any fairness 
opinion.  These failings are exacerbated by the customary 
indemnification arrangements and measured release from liability 
that investment banks demand and regularly receive in connection 
with their provision of a fairness opinion.40 
However, criticizing the obvious limitations of the fairness opinion 
form may be tendentiously unfair to investment bankers.  A fairness 
opinion delivered orally or in writing by the preparer at a board 
meeting is almost always, at least in a corporate control transaction, 
accompanied by a “board book.”41  The board book details the 
                                                          
 38. A typical acquiree-side fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction will 
state that the opinion therein is only provided to the board in connection with the 
board’s consideration of the transaction at hand and “does not constitute a 
recommendation to any stockholder as to how such stockholder should vote or act 
on any matter” relating to the transaction.  AT&T Proxy Statement, supra note 26, at 
B-2.  This statement is placed solely to restrict the investment bank’s potential 
liability to stockholders, and it is of doubtful effect since, in a public corporate 
control transaction, the opinion is required to be publicly disclosed and will be 
reviewed and possibly relied upon by the corporation’s stockholders.  See infra Part 
III.A (discussing fairness opinion disclosure requirements under the federal 
securities law).  Nonetheless, with or without these disclaimers, the exact scope of an 
investment bank’s liability to stockholders for the rendering of an “incorrect” 
fairness opinion is still uncertain and subject to much judicial and academic debate.  
For further discussion of this point and the potential scope of investment bank 
liability with respect to fairness opinions, see Fiflis, supra note 35; Giuffra, supra note 
10; M. Breen Haire, The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in Change-of-
Control Transactions:   In re Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999); Martin, 
supra note 10; Tariq Mundiya, Liability of Investment Banks:   An Update on Recent 
Developments, 11 INSIGHTS 15 (Oct. 1997); Dale A. Oesterle, Fairness Opinions as Magic 
Pieces of Paper, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1992); John S. Rubenstein, Note, Merger & 
Acquisition Fairness Opinions:   A Critical Look at Judicial Extensions of Liability to 
Investment Banks, 93 GEO. L.J. 1723, 1729-41 (2005); Shaw & Gac, supra note 1; 
Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, A Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneers’ 
Liability Regimes, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1158-71 (1992); Donald Lund, Comment, 
Toward a Standard for Third-Party Advisor Liability in Mergers and Buy-Outs:   Schneider 
and Beyond, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 603, 611-21 (1991). 
 39. It is therefore a strange dichotomy that a fairness opinion can opine that the 
consideration is fair to the corporation’s stockholders but is addressed and delivered 
to the board.   
 40. This limitation of liability usually releases an investment bank from all but its 
own willful misconduct or gross negligence.  For an example of an investment bank 
engagement letter containing such provisions, see John F. Seegal, Negotiating the 
Investment Banking Engagement Letter, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD 
COMPANY, at 173 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 61494, 
June-July, 2005). 
 41. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at n.29 (asserting the importance of 
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underlying analyses conducted by the opiner to arrive at and 
conclude financial fairness.42  It is here that the meat of the 
investment banker’s work lies.43  A well-advised board will review this 
book in connection with their receipt of a fairness opinion and 
question the bankers as to their derivation of fairness.44  It is in these 
actual analyses that the meaning and worth, if any, of a fairness 
opinion lies.45 
B. The Fairness Opinion—Delaware’s Pivotal Role 
The primacy and role of the fairness opinion stems from the 
vicissitudes of Delaware corporate law.  This is a fairly recent 
development.  Prior to 1985, the role and necessity of the fairness 
opinion in a corporate control transaction was a legal uncertainty.46  
These opinions existed solely as an investment banking product.47  
This is not to say that legal practitioners perceived these opinions as 
valueless in aid of board decision-making and satisfaction of a board’s 
fiduciary duties.  They did see such utility and routinely advised their 
obtainment.48  However, the need for a fairness opinion was not, at 
this time, recognized by the Delaware courts as an integral, or indeed 
                                                          
carefully reviewing the banker’s financial analyses set forth in a board book). 
 42. For examples of a board book, see Chiron Corp., Transaction Statement 
(Form 13e-3), at Ex. C3 (Nov. 11, 2005); Sungard Data Systems, Inc., Transaction 
Statement (Form 13e-3), at Ex. C7 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
 43. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 653-54 (observing that the bulk of the 
investment banker’s involvement is in the information-gathering and analysis stage, 
rather than in the actual delivery of the opinion). 
 44. Van Gorkom arguably set a legal requirement for this review under Delaware 
law by finding a board to have breached its duty of care in part due to the board’s 
failure to inquire and scrutinize the valuation information presented to it.  Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985).  This obligation was affirmed in Hanson 
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., when the Second Circuit applying Delaware 
law found a board to have breached its fiduciary duties by ‘baldly’ relying on a 
fairness opinion.  781 F.2d 264, 289 (2d Cir. 1986).  The court held that a board has 
“some oversight obligations to become reasonably familiar with an opinion, report, 
or other source of advice before becoming entitled to rely on it.”  Id. at 275.  
However, subsequent Delaware courts have tended to assign less significance to such 
a review; permitting boards to prima facie rely on fairness opinions and financial 
valuations without significant or, in some instances any, inquiry.  See infra notes 219-
226 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Van Gorkom treatment of fairness 
opinions by the Delaware courts). 
 45. See infra notes 229-233 and accompanying text for further discussion by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery of this distinction. 
 46. See supra Introduction. 
 47. See generally Feinstein, Valuation and Fairness Opinions, 32 BUS. LAW. 1337 
(1977). 
 48. One empirical study found that from 1980-1985, acquirees obtained fairness 
opinions in fifty-seven percent of public corporate control transactions (defined for 
such purposes as a merger, tender offer, exchange offer or leveraged buy-out).  
However, by 1985, only nineteen percent of acquirees obtained a fairness opinion in 
such transactions.  Bowers, supra note 12, at 573-74. 
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any, part of the corporate control transaction process, and, prior to 
1985, fairness opinions were rarely mentioned in Delaware 
jurisprudence.49 
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its opinion in Van 
Gorkom.50  The Court found the board of the Trans Union 
Corporation to have breached its duty of care by approving the 
acquisition of the corporation in a cash-out merger in a manner that 
was not the product of an informed business judgement.51  A full 
discussion and criticism of the facts and ruling of Van Gorkom could 
be, and has been, the topic of full academic study.52  However, for this 
Article it is sufficient to state that one of the principal bases for the 
Court’s holding was the failure of the board in its decision-making 
process to obtain or consider a well-prepared financial analysis as to 
the intrinsic worth of Trans Union.53  The Court stated: 
Several defendants testified that [they were legally advised] that 
Delaware law did not require a fairness opinion or an outside 
valuation of the Company before the Board could act on the 
Pritzker proposal.  If given, the advice was correct.  However, that 
did not end the matter.  Unless the directors had before them 
adequate information regarding the intrinsic value of the 
Company, upon which a proper exercise of business judgment 
could be made, mere advice of this type is meaningless . . . .54 
The Court held that the board’s failure to obtain anything more 
than a rough and unquestioned estimate of possible value from the 
corporation’s chief financial officer did not satisfy this explicated 
duty.55  More was required.56  However, it was obvious from any 
reading of the opinion, and reflected in the quote above, that a 
fairness opinion was not necessarily this requirement.  Rather, an 
acquiree board, as part of its greater duty of care in a corporate 
control transaction, was now obligated to duly inform itself as to its 
corporation’s sale value through a well-prepared financial analysis.57  
                                                          
 49. A Westlaw search in the Delaware state law case database resulted in only 
thirteen opinions issued prior to Van Gorkom which referenced a fairness opinion.  
The first mention of a fairness opinion in the case database is in the year 1977. 
 50. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 51. Id. at 888. 
 52. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 9; Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom:   
The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187 (1986); Symposium, Van 
Gorkom and the Corporate Board:   Problem, Solution, or Placebo, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 
(2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Trans Union 
Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988). 
 53. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 877-78. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 876. 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
2006] FAIRNESS OPINIONS 1571 
The fairness opinion would become institutionalized due to other 
entwinements of Delaware law. 
The transforming actor was Delaware statute title 8, section 141(e) 
of the Delaware Code.  This provision of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law provides that directors are “fully protected in 
relying in good faith . . . upon such information, opinions, reports or 
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s 
officers or employees . . . or by any other person as to matters the 
member reasonably believes are within such other person’s 
professional or expert competence.”58  The directors in Van Gorkom 
had claimed reliance on this statute based upon the advice of the 
corporation’s chief executive and chief financial officers.59  The Court 
rejected this defense in those circumstances but did strongly imply 
that the obtainment of a thoroughly prepared valuation study or a 
fairness opinion would satisfy not only the board’s duty of care to be 
duly informed as to corporate value, but would establish sufficient 
basis to rely on section 141(e).60  Later, Delaware court opinions 
would provide further buttressed support for this inference, 
particularly with respect to fairness opinions.61 
Interestingly, on this basis, academics and practitioners put forth 
the fairness opinion and not the financial analysis itself as a means for 
a board to advantage itself among the cross-currents of section 141(e) 
and Van Gorkom’s holding.62  However, it is clear that an outside 
valuation akin to the board book analysis should suffice thereunder—
a natural conclusion since the fairness opinion is derivative of the 
underlying valuation.63  There is nothing in the literature or that has 
otherwise been put forth to support this distinction.  It appears to 
have just happened, and post-Van Gorkom, the use of fairness opinions 
by acquirees in corporate control transactions became routine.64  As 
                                                          
 58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). 
 59. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875. 
 60. Id. at 876-77 (citing tit. 8, § 141(e) and stating that “under appropriate 
circumstances, such directors may be fully protected in relying in good faith upon 
the valuation reports of their management”). 
 61. See infra notes 219-226 and accompanying text (discussing post-Van Gorkom 
reliance on and endorsement of fairness opinions by Delaware courts). 
 62. See supra note 9 (discussing academic conclusions that, post-Van Gorkom, 
fairness opinions became a mandatory legal obligation). 
 63. See generally supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
 64. According to one empirical study, in the period 1986-1989 following Van 
Gorkom, fairness opinions were obtained by acquirees in fifty-five percent of public 
corporation control transactions (defined for such purposes as a merger, tender 
offer, exchange offer or leveraged buy-out).  In 1986, fairness opinions were 
obtained by forty-two percent of acquirees in such transactions as opposed to only 
nineteen of acquirees in 1985, the year of Van Gorkom.  Bowers, supra note 12, at 574-
75. 
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to why the fairness opinion was outsourced to investment banks and 
other financial advisors rather than internal corporate officer 
analysis, the reasons are straight-forward.  First, the delivery of this 
financial information through an investment bank shifts potential 
liability from internal corporate actors to outside, more liability-
remote parties.  Second, if the recipient is the acquiree in a corporate 
control transaction it avoids systemic management conflict, since 
officers oftentimes benefit substantially from a corporate control 
transaction in disproportion to unaffiliated stockholders.65 
Finally, in Van Gorkom, the court treated the need for a well-
prepared financial analysis of value in a corporate control transaction 
as a creature independent of the process utilized to arrive at an 
offered price.66  That is, the court treated the need for this analysis as 
an island divorced from other considerations and actions in a 
corporate control transaction.  The court did pay credence, but did 
not accept, commonly held finance principles as to value being the 
price in the efficient market and the post-agreement market check67 
or auction process as an alternative to achieving fair value 
                                                          
 65. This benefit most commonly takes the form of “golden parachutes,” 
accelerated option vesting, and other compensation mechanisms which award 
executives upon a change in control of the corporation.  However, the 
disproportionate gain can also take the form of employment or consulting 
arrangements, non-competition agreements, or other future benefits provided by the 
acquirer to the acquiree’s management.  See also LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 
37, § 10.09 (discussing executive compensation in merger and acquisition 
transactions and the tax treatment thereof); Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden 
Parachutes:  Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 955-63 (1987) (detailing use 
and structure of golden parachutes).  See generally Barbara B. Creed & Jay David 
Gayner, Terms of Employment:  A Review of Employment Practices Related to Changes in 
Corporate Control, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1987:  PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND 
STRATEGIES (PLI Corp. Tax Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 254, 
1987) (discussing various types of executive compensation in the corporate change 
of control context). 
 66. The court did this by establishing a per se requirement for a financial analysis 
in a corporate control transaction.  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875. 
 67. A market check is a mechanism whereby a corporation will agree to be 
acquired without conducting an auction or soliciting all potential acquirers.  The 
post-agreement price will then be “checked” via the market.  More specifically, if a 
second, higher offer does emerge after announcement of the agreement, the 
acquiree retains the ability to terminate the initial agreement and enter into a new 
acquisition agreement with the second, higher bidder.  Under Delaware corporate 
law, a market check is a permitted acquisition mechanism.  Additionally, in 
connection with its agreement to a market check, an acquiree may agree to deal 
protection devices that inhibit but do not prevent a second, higher bid and that 
require payment of a break-up fee to the initial acquirer if their agreement is 
terminated due to a second bid.  See, e.g., In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
787 A.2d 691, 705-06 (Del. Ch. 2001); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC 
Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 292-93 (Del. Ch. 1998); In re Fort Howard Corp. 
Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 83147, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1988).  See generally Charles 
F. Richards, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Return of the Market Check, 15 No. 6 INSIGHTS 20, 
20 (2001) (outlining the contours of a Delaware post-agreement market check). 
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independent of a valuation or fairness opinion delivered to a board.68  
However, this does not comport with finance beliefs then or now.  
Assuming financial analysis actually can inform as to value, the 
minimum value range that a similarly informed financial analysis 
should arrive at should roughly equate with the unaffected, minimum 
price achievable in a properly run market-based process such as an 
auction.  If such process is actually utilized, a financial analysis or 
fairness opinion to confirm the “fairness” of a price is superfluous.69  
The Delaware courts’ response to (or more appropriately conscious 
ignorance of) this dichotomy is discussed further infra at Part III.C. 
II. REVIEW OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION 
This Part explores the limitations of the fairness opinion.  More 
specifically, it could be posited that the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of a required acquiree financial analysis in Van Gorkom 
was a flawed one because it rested on quicksand assumptions about 
the inherent accuracy and comparability of the valuation practices 
undergirding fairness opinions.  These deficits were compounded by 
a process-based defect:  the inherent conflicts in investment banking 
fairness opinion practices post-Van Gorkom.  By stress-testing the 
fairness opinion with the weight of these arguments, this Part 
attempts to outline the true parameters of the fairness opinion’s 
utility. 
A. The Valuation Problem 
1. Subjectivity 
A fairness opinion’s worth ultimately lies in the reliability and 
accuracy of its underlying valuation analyses.70  This is the realm of 
finance—and academics have made significant strides in the previous 
decades to develop techniques by which a theoretically reliable range 
                                                          
 68. The defendants argued in Van Gorkom that any breach of their duty of care 
had been cured by the post-agreement market check conducted by Trans Union.  
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878.  The court dismissed this argument on the basis that the 
agreements and time limitations agreed to by the Trans Union board did not truly 
permit a meaningful market test.  Id. at 880, 885.  The court did not address whether 
a proper market check would have cured the found breach.  In comparison, the 
dissenting opinion in Van Gorkom cited the market test conducted by Trans Union 
approvingly as “buttressing” an informed business judgment.  Id. at 897 (McNeilly, J., 
dissenting). 
 69. I flesh out this argument infra notes 305-308 and accompanying text. 
 70. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance Theory in 
Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2003) (surveying several financial theories 
and methodologies used in valuation analyses and the comparative utility of each). 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
1574 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1557 
of values can be achieved.71  However, there is still an element of 
subjectivity present in the choice and application of these methods.72  
The end-result is to provide the preparer discretion to effect the 
outcome of a valuation and a diminished ability for outsiders to make 
comparative assessments of analyses. 
There are a number of different underlying valuation analyses 
upon which a fairness opinion can rest.  The most common and 
accepted techniques are discounted cash flow,73 comparable 
companies,74 premium,75 break-up,76 and liquidation analysis.77  The 
                                                          
 71. See supra note 14 (citing historical discussions of these developments). 
 72. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issues. 
 73. A discounted cash flow analysis calculates the present value of the future free 
cash flows of the corporation by discounting the cash flows at a specific discount rate.  
In practice, a discounted cash flow of a corporate entity consists of three principal 
components.  First, an estimate is made of the future free cash flows of the 
corporation over a set period of time, typically three to ten years but variant 
depending upon available projections.  Second, a value of the corporation’s free cash 
flows in perpetuity after this discrete period is forecasted.  This second value is 
known as a terminal value, and it is typically calculated by applying a perpetual 
growth rate to the estimated cash flow in the first year of this period.  Finally, the 
cash flows derived in the first two steps are discounted back at an appropriate 
discount rate to arrive at a present value of all of the future cash flows of the 
corporation.  See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80, 551 (outlining the 
methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow analysis of a business); MARK 
GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 299-324 
(2d ed. 2002) (outlining the methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow 
analysis of real assets); PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 155-62 (outlining the 
methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow analysis of a business). 
 74. A comparable companies analysis compares the corporation being valued 
against selected similarly situated, publicly traded companies.  These companies are 
compared using price multiples of each corporation’s stock against selected 
benchmarks, such as price to future earnings, price to forecasted sales, or price to 
book.  A well-performed comparable companies analysis will adjust the capital 
structures of each comparable company in order to more accurately compare them 
with the corporation being valued.  See generally ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT 
VALUATION, at 453-56 (2002) (discussing various methods of comparable company 
valuation); KRISHNA G. PALEPU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ANALYSIS & 
VALUATION 7-16 - 7-23 (1997) (noting the complexities and difficulties that arise in 
comparable companies valuation). 
 75. A premium analysis compares the premium being paid in the corporate 
control transaction against historical premiums paid, for selected, similarly-situated 
companies.  Typically, a premium analysis is conducted side-by-side with a 
comparable companies analysis often utilizing the same corporate entities.  See 
generally DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 712 (discussing parallel use of these 
techniques in change of control transactions). 
 76. A break-up analysis, sometimes called a sum-of-parts analysis, assumes that the 
different businesses of the corporation will be parceled out separately and sold.  It 
then values each of these units on a stand-alone basis to derive a value for the entire 
corporate entity.  See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 650 (discussing the 
application of a break-up analysis in the fairness opinion context). 
 77. A liquidation analysis assumes that the assets of the corporation will be sold 
separately in an orderly liquidation of the firm.  It then values the assets of the 
corporation on this basis.  It is different than a break-up analysis in that it assumes 
that each business entity can be liquidated and sold as other than a going-concern, 
whereas a break-up analysis assumes that each business will be sold intact.  See 
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preparer of a fairness opinion will typically utilize a weighted 
combination of these to arrive at a fairness conclusion.78  The choice 
of a particular analysis to employ and the weight given to each is 
partially subjective and depends upon the asset being valued and the 
relevant circumstances.79  For example, in the corporate control 
transaction paradigm the most important analysis is, absent unusual 
                                                          
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 640-42 (discussing application of a liquidation analysis in 
the fairness opinion context). 
 78. See, e.g., Maytag Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at 59-63 (fairness opinion 
prepared by Lazard Freres & Co., LLC based in part on discounted cash flow, 
comparable company, and premiums paid analyses); Toys “R” Us, Inc., Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 24-30 (May 23, 2005) (fairness opinion 
prepared by Credit Suisse First Boston LLC based in part on discounted cash flow, 
comparable company, premiums paid, and break-up analyses); Cysive, Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 38-46 (Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter 
Cysive Proxy Statement] (fairness opinion prepared by Broadview International, LLC 
based in part on comparable company, premiums paid, and liquidation analyses). 
 79. For example, a discounted cash flow analysis generally requires that the 
stream of future free cash flows be steady and ascertainable.  See, e.g., Cysive Proxy 
Statement, supra note 78, at 45 (disclosing that fairness opinion did not rely upon a 
discounted cash flow analysis since the corporation’s “business model has never been 
cash flow positive and management was uncertain in estimating . . . the future cash 
flows”).  Thus, for a recently-formed corporation or one that is in a state of flux with 
no reliable, forecasted free cash flows, a discounted cash flow analysis is 
inappropriate.  See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *7 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (using comparable company analysis to value corporation for 
purposes of an appraisal proceeding and stating that a discounted cash flow analysis 
for these purposes would be of marginal utility “in the absence of reasonably reliable 
contemporaneous projections [and] the degree of speculation and uncertainty 
characterizing the future prospects of [the corporation]”).  Meanwhile, a 
comparable companies analysis can only be conducted when there exists comparable 
publicly traded companies.  This is sometimes not the case.  See, e.g., In re Radiology 
Assoc., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (asserting that differences 
between proposed comparable companies were so large that any comparable 
companies comparison was meaningless).  Similarly, a break-up analysis is only 
appropriate when the corporation consists of a discrete set of separately identifiable 
businesses.  See generally Dean LeBaron & Lawrence S. Speidell, Why Are the Parts 
Worth More than the Sum? “Chop Shop,” A Corporate Valuation Model, in THE MERGER 
BOOM 78 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1987).  Finally, a liquidation 
analysis is typically employed when the viability of the corporation as a going-concern 
is at issue or otherwise when the corporation consists primarily of real assets, such as 
oil deposits, since liquidation analysis fails to capture good-will and other inherent 
value in the corporation as a going-concern.  See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 538 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that directors of the corporation 
preferred sale of corporation rather than liquidation, “as such a transaction could 
result in a recognition of the value [of the corporation], whereas a liquidation was 
unlikely to yield as high a price”); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 WL 201390, 
at *16-*17 (Del. Ch. 1990) (noting use of liquidation analysis to value oil corporation 
for fairness opinion, but stating that the investment bank did not primarily rely upon 
this analysis as it considered such a liquidation unlikely).  See generally DAMODARAN, 
supra note 74, at 946-50 (describing available business valuation models and the 
appropriate use of each to arrive at a reasonable value determination); ASWATH 
DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION (2001) (examining the use and limits of 
valuation techniques in the context of valuing high technology and new economy 
firms); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 617-44 (explaining various recurring valuation 
techniques and the appropriate use of each in the fairness opinion context). 
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circumstances, the discounted cash flow calculus.80  However, in the 
investment banking community, there are no uniform, specific, and 
objective guidelines as to the exact mix and weight to assign to each 
of these methods to arrive at fairness. 
Each of the techniques in and of themselves is also prone to 
subjectivity.  For example, a discounted cash flow analysis is 
conducted by discounting back at a chosen discount rate the 
projected future free cash flows and terminal value of an asset.81  In 
performing this analysis there are three central choices, which must 
be made, each of which can significantly affect the final valuation.  
These are the correct forecasted free cash flows to utilize,82 the 
appropriate discount rate,83 and the terminal value of the asset.84  
                                                          
 80. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80; DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 11.  
This preference extends to the Delaware courts.  See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC 
Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The [discounted cash 
flow] method is frequently used in this court and, I, like many others, prefer to give it 
great, and sometimes even exclusive, weight when it may be used responsibly.”); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. 1990) (claiming 
the discounted cash flow analysis “is in theory the single best technique to estimate 
the value of an economic asset”). 
 81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (elaborating on the parameters of a 
discounted cash flow analysis and the definition of terminal value). 
 82. These are generally available forecasts previously prepared by management 
of the corporation.  BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 551.  Cf. Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2003) (asserting that 
management projections are particularly useful in the appraisal context because they 
are by definition not tainted by transaction pressures and hindsight), aff’d in relevant 
part, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005).  However, sometimes such forecasts do not exist or 
are otherwise unreliable.  In such circumstances, free cash flow numbers must be 
created out of whole cloth with consequent heightened subjectivity, uncertainty, and 
manipulability. 
 83. The accepted industry method for computation of a discount rate is to 
compute the corporation’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), otherwise 
known as the corporation’s opportunity cost of capital for its assets.  WACC is 
typically computed in accordance with the following formula:   rdebt(1-
Tc)(D/V)+requity(E/V) where rdebt = rate of return on the corporation’s debt; requity = 
rate of return on the corporation’s equity; D = value of the corporation’s debt; E = 
value of the corporation’s equity; V = D+E; and Tc = the corporation’s marginal tax 
rate.  BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 230-31.  The computation of WACC requires 
ascertainment of the rate of return on the corporation’s equity or requity.  A 
corporation’s return on equity can also be phrased as the risk premium of the 
corporation’s stock over and above the market risk premium which itself is the 
general return of the market over and above the risk free rate.  There is debate and 
disagreement over the appropriate methodology to estimate a corporation’s requity; 
however, industry practice is to use the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”).  See 
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.  The CAPM is calculated in accordance 
with the following formula:   Requity = Rfree+ (Rmarket-Rfree) where Rfree = risk free rate (e.g., 
rate on governmental bonds);  (Beta) = covariance between the market’s return and 
the individual corporation’s stock return; and Rmarket = return on the market.  BREALEY 
& MYERS, supra note 14, at 169-77, 194-97; see also DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 154-
59, 181-206 (setting forth example calculation methods for Rfree, Rmarket and Beta). 
 84. Terminal value typically comprises the majority of the future free cash flows 
of the corporation.  BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 531. 
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There is substantial leeway to determine each of these, and any 
change can markedly affect the discounted cash flow value.85  For 
example, a change in the discount rate by one percent on a stream of 
cash flows in the billions of dollars can change the discounted cash 
flow value by tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars.86  However, 
again there is no standard-setting or other body guiding these or 
other preparation decisions.  Rather, a discounted cash flow analysis, 
like other valuation analyses, is typically compiled using historically 
developed and unguided industry practices as influenced and first 
                                                          
 85. Future free cash flows, as with any forecast, are predictions of future 
performance that may or may not be correct and are subject to the preparer’s best 
judgement.  It is no understatement to assert that there can be vast disagreement on 
what constitutes the best estimates of future performance and the appropriate future 
forecasted free cash flows of a corporation.  See Kenton K. Yee, Combining Value 
Estimates to Increase Accuracy, 60 FIN. ANAL. J. 23, 23 (July/August 2004) (stating that 
“[b]ecause of uncertainty in prospective cash flows [discounted cash flow analysis] 
inevitably leads to an imprecise answer”).  The calculation of the discount rate using 
the CAPM involves estimates of Rfree, Rmarket, and Beta.  There is potential subjectivity 
in each of these decisions.  Rmarket has historically been thought to be seven to nine 
percent but recent studies have argued that it is a lower figure, in the five to six 
percent range.  See ELROY DIMSON ET AL., TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS:   101 YEARS OF 
GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 165, 175, 211 (2002) (stating that over one hundred 
and one years “the annualized (geometric mean) US equity risk premium relative to 
bills was 5.8[%]” and that this is 1.5% lower than those of previous long-term studies 
of the U.S. markets); see also DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 162 (noting that the 
market risk premium can range from 4.5%-12.67% depending upon preparer 
choice); PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 177 n.20 (identifying differences of opinion 
as to methods of calculating equity risk premium).  Rfree can vary depending upon 
the country and the period referenced for determination of the rate.  For example, 
each of the one-year, ten-year, and thirty-year government bond rates differ, but it is 
possible to rationally select any of them depending upon the circumstances.  
DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 162-64; GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73, at 155.  
Finally, Beta, when calculated using regression, is subject to variance depending 
upon the length of time and measure of the market returns utilized.  Id. at 158.  If 
the corporation is not publicly traded, then estimating Beta becomes more difficult 
and subject to increased uncertainty and discretion.  BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, 
at 234-38; DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 191-207.  Terminal value is typically 
calculated using a perpetuity:   X/(r-g) where X = an estimate of the future free cash 
flows in the first year of the perpetuity, r = WACC, and g = the perpetual growth rate.  
Id. at 305.  X is a forecast and subject to the same caveats made supra with respect to 
forecasts.  The subjectivity inherent in WACC calculations is also discussed supra.  
Finally, there is no agreed upon standard perpetual growth rate, though it is typically 
in the two to three percent range. 
 86. If the discount rate is ten percent on a stream of cash flows that is $100 
million in each of years one through five, and thereafter has a terminal value of $1 
billion (terminal value being calculated here using a zero percent perpetual growth 
rate and a cash flow in year six of $100 million so that $1 billion = TV = $100 
million/10%), the discounted cash flow value is $944 million.  See generally supra 
notes 73 & 85 (setting forth method of calculation of discounted cash flow and 
terminal value, respectively).  If the discount rate is lowered to nine percent, the 
discounted cash flow value is now $1.051 billion.  Thus, here a 1% change in the 
discount rate results in an 11.4% difference in value.  Cf. Metlyn Realty Corp. v. 
Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “valuations are highly 
sensitive to assumptions about the firm’s costs and rate of growth, and about the 
discount rate”).  
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put forth by academic practitioners.  This lends itself to differences in 
valuation approach in each application and among institutions as 
each of them develops their own individual approach.87  This issue 
arises not only with a discounted cash flow analysis, but with each of 
the other valuation techniques.88 
This dazzling variability makes it difficult to rely, compare, or 
analyze the valuations underlying a fairness opinion unless full 
disclosure is made of the various inputs in the valuation process, the 
weight assigned for each, and the rationale underlying these choices.  
The substantial discretion and lack of guidelines and standards also 
makes the process vulnerable to manipulation to arrive at the “right” 
answer for fairness.89  This raises a further dilemma in light of the 
conflicted nature of the investment banks who often provide these 
opinions, an issue discussed infra at Part II.B. 
2. Best practices 
The issues with valuation practice today are not limited to a 
problem of subjectivity.  Industry valuation practice, as it is currently 
conducted, also lags in many material respects and in circumstances 
is even contradictory to modern finance theory.  For example, 
investment banks typically use the capital asset pricing model 
(“CAPM”)90 to calculate the weighted average cost of capital 
(“WACC”), or discount rate,91 for a discounted cash flow analysis.92  
However, current academic literature disputes the empirical validity 
of this tool and instead has suggested alternatives to attain greater 
                                                          
 87. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80 (observing the differing 
results obtainable depending upon the choice of inputs for a discounted cash flow 
analysis). 
 88. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches 
for preparing comparable companies, premium, break-up, and liquidation analyses). 
 89. See generally Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties:   On the Need for 
Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 218 (1997) 
(arguing that financial valuation is inescapably subjective and therefore, if viewed 
with suspicion is “inherently manipulable”). 
 90. See supra note 83 (defining the CAPM). 
 91. See supra note 83 (defining WACC and discount rate). 
 92. See DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 219 (discussing recent study of industry 
practices with respect to estimation of the cost of equity).  Investment banks are not 
the only entities who continue to use this model.  A recent empirical survey of 392 
firms found that seventy-four percent of them always, or almost always, utilize the 
CAPM to value real assets.  John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and 
Practice of Corporate Finance:   Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 197 (2001).  
However, there is disparity here as well, and investment banks have been known to 
use other methods to calculate WACC.  See, e.g., Sungard Data Systems, Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 34-35 (June 27, 2005) [hereinafter 
Sungard Proxy Statement] (disclosing investment bank calculated discount rate for 
fairness opinion analysis by referencing WACC of comparable companies). 
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accuracy.93  Furthermore, academic research concerning market risk 
premiums has found the seven to nine percent rate historically 
utilized for purposes of the CAPM to be overstated and actually in the 
five to six percent range—this too has only been partly translated into 
industry practice.94  The consequent result is that fairness opinions 
today are frequently premised upon uncertain valuation 
methodology.95 
The most likely reason for this failure to follow best practices is the 
absence of a direct conduit between academics and practitioners for 
the transmission of theories, developments, and research.  Rather, 
these are currently communicated through osmosis as practitioners 
interact with academics and employ graduated students taught these 
new methods.  Investment banks also have limited incentive to 
improve upon this inefficient method of knowledge transfer.  
Corporations regularly purchase this product as prepared now (and if 
an acquiree is essentially required to make such buy); as with any bad 
habit, why change if there is no impetus to do so?96  The result is the 
slow and haphazard adoption of new techniques and principles as 
well as recognition of incorrect practices.  More specifically, industry 
valuations are regularly compiled based upon tenets that academics 
no longer deem valid or otherwise dispute.97 
It is not only a matter of increased communication and earlier 
absorption of research findings.  Academics are in disagreement over 
aspects central to valuation practice.  For example, studies dispute 
the appropriate methodology to calculate many of the various inputs 
in the CAPM,98 a tool which, as noted, itself is also disputed.99  These 
                                                          
 93. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 198-210 (outlining criticisms of the 
CAPM and possible greater utility of multi-factor models); GRINBLATT & TITMAN, 
supra note 73, at 158-68, 175-209 (describing empirical tests of the CAPM and multi-
factor models).  See generally SHANNON P. PRATT, COST OF CAPITAL:   ESTIMATION AND 
APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2002) (exploring the principles underlying estimation of the 
CAPM and addressing commonly encountered variations in its application).   
 94. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 211-12. 
 95. See, e.g., Arthur H. Rosenbloom & Drew G.L. Chapman, Commentary, Fairness 
Opinions—Can They be Made Useful?, 9 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 12 (2003) 
(noting several examples of investment bank failure to follow best practices). 
 96. This is particularly true in today’s current regime where there are no 
governing standards, an uncertain liability regime governing the provision of fairness 
opinions, and, to the extent permitted by law, a blanket practice of corporations 
indemnifying and releasing investment banks from liability for the provision of a 
fairness opinion.  See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 12, at 575 (stating that cases on 
investment bank liability for fairness opinions are “relatively small in number and too 
divergent to establish a legal standard”); Fiflis, supra note 35 (discussing grounds for 
investment bank liability for rendering defective fairness opinions). 
 97. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 35 (examining investment bank deficiencies in the 
preparation of fairness opinions). 
 98. See supra note 85.  See generally GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73, at 155-58 
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conflicts have led to a pick-and-choose approach among practitioners 
with an obvious possible bias towards choosing the course indicative 
of the desired outcome.100 
3. A telling example 
Illustrative of the difficulties and issues delineated supra is a recent 
Delaware Court of Chancery opinion issued by Vice Chancellor Strine 
in Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc.101  Andaloro was a consolidated 
appraisal102 action arising out of the acquisition by PNC Financial 
Services Group (“PNC”) of the two percent minority interest that it 
did not own in its subsidiary, PFPC Worldwide, Inc. (“PFPC”) at a 
price of $34.26 per share.103  Vice Chancellor Strine’s appraisal 
required him to make a judicial determination in accordance with 
Delaware corporate law as to the fair value of the minority stake on 
the date of acquisition.104  The intricacies of appraisal proceedings 
and the Delaware standard governing such matters have been the 
subject of much study.105  It is fair to say that the statutory manner in 
                                                          
(surveying the various discretion and disagreement in determining the inputs for the 
CAPM model). 
 99. See supra note 93. 
 100. See, e.g., Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that 
financial valuation “calling for the court to derive a single best estimate of value 
based on the ‘expert input’ of finance professionals paid to achieve diametrically 
opposite objectives tends, regrettably, to surface minor, granular issues . . . . which 
are not well addressed in the academic literature”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Delaware law provides that in certain mergers, consolidations, and other 
transactions a stockholder can “dissent” and seek appraisal by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery of his or her stock.  The stockholder is then entitled to payment of the 
appraisal amount, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting 
corporation in the relevant transaction.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001). 
 103. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *1.  The Court of Chancery in Andaloro was 
also confronted with a claim of equitable breach of fiduciary duty.  Id.  However, the 
court only addressed the appraisal question in its opinion as its findings thereto were 
dispositive of the breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Id. at *1, *22. 
 104. Under Delaware law, the Court of Chancery in an appraisal proceeding is 
required to determine fair value by establishing the value of the entity as a going 
concern.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001).  For these purposes, the value 
arising from the transaction itself is excluded.  Id.  However, any minority discount is 
also eliminated.  Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *8. 
 105. See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
1121 (1998) (critiquing the Delaware appraisal remedy under a preference 
reconciliation theory); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy:   An Essay 
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962) (arguing that the Delaware appraisal remedy 
is legally disconnected from its’ traditionally justified purpose); Mary Siegel, Back to 
the Future:   Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995) 
(recommending a more-tailored Delaware appraisal remedy); Randall S. Thomas, 
Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (tracing the history of 
the Delaware appraisal remedy and proposing revision); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, 
Liquidity, and Majority Rule:   Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995) 
(arguing for a modernization of the Delaware appraisal remedy). 
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which they are required to be conducted does not comport with 
modern finance principles or theory.106  Nonetheless, to compute fair 
value, Vice Chancellor Strine, inter alia, conducted a valuation of the 
minority stake using a discounted cash flow analysis.107 
Vice Chancellor Strine was aided in this task by the petitioners’ and 
respondent’s experts who each prepared his own valuation.108  Not 
surprisingly, there was a marked difference of opinion between the 
two:   the petitioners’ expert discounted cash flow analysis arrived at a 
price of $60.76 per share while the respondent’s expert computed a 
price of $21.35.109  Also not surprisingly, each purported to be based 
on the right principles but was prepared using different 
methodologies, approaches, and numbers.110  Nonetheless, Vice 
Chancellor Strine used these two valuations as a touchstone; he 
traced each step in the valuation process and picked from one or the 
other expert’s choice, and, in certain circumstances, he deviated 
from both and made his own conclusions.111 
First, Vice Chancellor Strine settled on the appropriate forecasted 
free cash flow numbers to conduct the discounted cash flow 
calculation.112  Here, the two expert parties were in material 
agreement that available management projections were the best 
available figures.113  This was fortuitous for valuation purposes, as 
disagreement about the underlying numbers would have led to even 
more divergent expert results.114  Vice Chancellor Strine, accordingly, 
                                                          
 106. See William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products:   The Pretty Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) (commenting that the 
Delaware courts have neglected increasing doubts about the CAPM’s perceived 
“inability to explain significant aspects of market returns”); Campbell, supra note 70, 
at 4 (claiming that courts “have, to a significant extent, failed to base their opinions 
on modern finance theory”); William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the 
Nonexistent:   The Delaware Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845 
(2003) (arguing that use of control premiums in appraisal proceedings is not 
supported by modern corporate finance theory). 
 107. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9-*16. 
 108. Id. at *2.  The petitioners in the appraisal proceeding were the dissenting 
minority stockholders of PFPC.  The respondent in the proceeding was PFPC.  The 
parties were also plaintiffs and defendant, respectively, for purposes of the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  Id. at *1. 
 109. Id. at *10.  Salomon Smith Barney had previously found a valuation range for 
PFPC of $20.78 to $34.26 per share.  This range removed any minority discount and 
included a squeeze-out premium.  Salomon Smith Barney rendered a fairness 
opinion to PNC based on this valuation.  Id. at *8. 
 110. See infra notes 113-142 and accompanying text. 
 111. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9-*16.  Vice Chancellor Strine stated that “at 
the margins, [I have] resolved doubts in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, the 
valuation I set forth is more optimistic than is strictly justified.”  Id. at *9. 
 112. Id. at *10-*11. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5-*8 
(Del. Ch. 1995); see also supra note 86 (discussing the effect of a revision in the 
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relied upon these management projections with only one slight 
alteration recommended by the petitioners’ expert.115 
Second, Vice Chancellor Strine calculated PFPC’s terminal value116 
by adopting petitioners’ expert’s three-stage terminal value 
approach.117  In doing so, he rejected the two-stage model proposed 
by respondent’s expert.118  The three-stage approach divides up 
terminal value into two different periods of higher than normal 
growth.119  While theoretically this approach should arrive at the same 
result as a two-stage analysis, which only uses one period for terminal 
value, it more precisely illustrates actual corporate growth.120  For this 
three-stage model, petitioners’ expert employed a second-stage, four-
year growth rate of 13.2% and a third-stage, terminal value perpetual 
growth rate of five percent versus respondent’s steady terminal value 
perpetual growth rate of five percent.121  Vice Chancellor Strine 
combined these approaches and chose a three-stage approach using a 
three-year growth rate of eight percent followed by a perpetual 
growth rate of five percent.122  In his opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine 
rebutted petitioners’ initial choice of a higher rate but did not 
explain the basis for his choice of eight percent and five percent, 
other than a statement that he disagreed with petitioners’ expert, but 
was more “bullish” than respondent’s expert.123  In fact, a five percent 
perpetual growth rate is simply wrong as it assumes that PFPC would, 
                                                          
numbers utilized on a discounted cash flow valuation). 
 115. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *11. 
 116. See supra note 73 (defining terminal value and discussing its role in a 
discounted cash flow calculation). 
 117. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12-*13. 
 118. Id. at *12. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  A three-stage growth rate approach is more illustrative because a 
corporation may have changing forecasted growth rates.  If this is true, separating 
terminal value into two different periods more accurately captures the different 
projected future growth rates of the corporation over time.  However, a two-stage 
approach should theoretically arrive at the same result because the perpetual growth 
rate would take into account this differential growth as an average over time. 
 121. Id. at *12-*13.  Petitioner estimated post-2007 growth by “decreasing PFPC’s 
growth in a linear way from the last year of the management projections in 2007, 
which [he] calculated as a 20.3% increase in unlevered free cash flow, adjusting for 
Retirement Services.”  Id.  The court did not put forth the rationale behind 
petitioners’ expert’s choice of five percent for the tertiary stage of growth.  Id.  
Respondent’s expert posited that growth would slow after 2007 and therefore set a 
growth rate of five percent by assuming that PFPC would grow at six percent for the 
three years after 2007 and that a five percent figure thereafter was more in line with 
national economic growth.  Id.  Whether any of these is right is anyone’s guess.  See 
generally DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 268-99 (outlining techniques to estimate 
future growth for purposes of estimating future cash flows). 
 122. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13. 
 123. Id. 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
2006] FAIRNESS OPINIONS 1583 
using historical rates, eventually outgrow the size of the U.S. 
economy—an impossibility.124 
Third, Vice Chancellor Strine set the corporation’s going-forward 
capital structure.125  This is a required pre-step in the determination 
of a corporation’s WACC.126  Respondent’s expert targeted an all-
equity structure for PFPC based on comparative assessment of PFPC’s 
competitors, while petitioners’ expert had assumed the continued 
existence of PFPC’s $1.29 billion parent-subsidiary indebtedness for a 
hybrid debt/equity structure.127  Vice Chancellor Strine found 
compelling respondent’s expert’s argument, and adopted an all-
equity model.128  Accordingly, he discounted the value of the 
corporation’s debt at maturity.129  He then discounted it back at the 
ultimate discount rate he determined for the cost of equity and 
deducted this amount from the total value derived.130  While the 
opinion is unclear on this point, Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision to 
discount the debt from maturity appears to unjustifiably reduce the 
debt’s value due to its equity nature when discounting at the cost of 
equity alone should be sufficient.  The result appears to be a double-
discount of the debt.  The petitioner’s position therefore appears 
                                                          
 124. From 1929 to 2002, the average annual rate of growth of real United States 
Gross Domestic Product was 3.4%.  BUREAU OF ECON. STATISTICS, News Release:   
National Income and Product Accounts Comprehensive Revision, Dec. 10, 2003, available at 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrel/2003cr_newsrelease.htm.  Thus, the five percent 
(presumed real) number is well above the growth rate of the U.S. economy.  See 
DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 306 (“[The] growth rate cannot exceed the growth 
rate of the economy in which a firm operates . . .”).  Vice Chancellor Strine even 
acknowledged that this was a high number.  Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 n.49.  
Possibly, he chose this high growth rate because of the petitioners’ and respondent’s 
experts’ unexplained agreement upon such figure, as well as his statement in the 
opinion that he would err in his valuation on the side more favorable to the 
petitioners.  Id.  Another explanation is that Vice Chancellor Strine used a nominal 
rather than a real rate.  However, all of this is conjecture.   
 125. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13-*14. 
 126. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 532-36; see also supra note 83 (defining 
WACC). 
 127. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13.  Petitioners’ expert likely favored the 
maintenance of outstanding debt in this instance as the addition of debt results in 
tax shields which lower WACC and increase the value of the corporation.  BREALEY & 
MYERS, supra note 14, at 533. 
 128. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13.  Vice Chancellor Strine adopted this 
approach since the indebtedness was owed to PFPC’s parent and could not otherwise 
have been incurred in the market.  It was therefore akin to an equity investment and 
should be treated as such.  Id. at *13-*14. 
 129. Id. at *14. 
 130. Id.  In contrast, respondent’s expert had “subtracted out the net debt of 
PFPC, using the par value of the debt to PNC in that calculation, from its capital 
structure.”  Id. at *13.  Vice Chancellor Strine adopted a different approach since 
PNC did not have the right, as of the merger date, to demand full repayment of the 
loan.  Id. at *14.  Accordingly, Vice Chancellor Strine argued that, “[g]iving some 
weight to the contractual terms of the note, one can make the case for some discount 
from par in the value of the debt to PNC.”  Id.   
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correct and is supported in the literature which recommends 
petitioner’s approach when subtracting out debt for purposes of 
calculating the cost of equity and WACC. 131 
Finally, Vice Chancellor Strine used the CAPM to calculate the 
return on equity for purposes of determining WACC.132  Vice 
Chancellor Strine utilized the same rates assigned by petitioners’ and 
respondent’s experts for the risk free rate—4.7%, and market risk 
premium—seven percent.133  However, the seven percent figure, as 
noted supra, is most likely a percentage point or two high.  For the 
required Beta134 figure the experts diverged in opinion as to method 
of calculation.135  They both referenced the same comparable 
company Betas but measured them over different periods (five years 
versus two years) and unlevered them in a different manner.136  Vice 
Chancellor Strine rejected both methods and instead averaged four 
separate Beta calculations—the median of the petitioners’ and 
respondent’s experts’ Betas and the average Betas of four core 
companies over two-year and five-year horizons.137  This decision to 
average the four Betas in this manner is not supported by the 
literature as an accepted method to calculate Beta for a private 
corporation.138  Nonetheless, Vice Chancellor Strine computed a Beta 
of 1.20 versus 1.22 for the respondent’s expert and 1.04 for the 
petitioners’ expert.139  He then inputted these numbers into the 
CAPM to arrive at a WACC of 13.92%.140 He then inexplicably 
                                                          
   131.   BREARLY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 532-36. 
 132. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *14-*16; see also supra note 83 for a discussion 
of the CAPM and the return on equity and their respective roles in the calculation of 
WACC. 
 133. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *14.  Because Vice Chancellor Strine had 
decided to set an all-equity capital structure for PFPC, WACC for these purposes was 
PFPC’s cost of equity.  Vice Chancellor Strine therefore was not required to 
determine the corporation’s cost of debt or marginal tax rate.  BREALEY & MYERS, 
supra note 14, at 531.  In any event, a market risk premium of seven percent is higher 
than what recent academic studies believe is correct.  DIMSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 
211-12. 
 134. For a definition of Beta and its role in the CAPM, see supra note 83. 
 135. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15. 
 139. See DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 198 (stating that average Beta should be 
computed using market-weighted or equal-weighted averages of the comparable 
companies).  As noted, Vice Chancellor Strine also stated that the experts did not 
unlever their Betas in an identical way.  Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15.  
However, he did not discuss in the opinion how they or he conducted the required 
comparable company Beta unlevering.  Id.; see also PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 167-
68 (outlining requirement to unlever comparable company Betas to adjust their 
capital structure to that of the valued corporation). 
   140.    Id.  
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rounded down this percentage to 13.5%.141  Using this 13.5% figure 
to discount back the modified management projections and terminal 
value, Vice Chancellor Strine arrived at a discounted cash flow value 
for PFPC of $32.08.142 
Is this right?  Well, no.  There are obvious flaws in Vice Chancellor 
Strine’s valuation.  The calculation of the equity discount rate, 
including Beta and terminal values, as well as the market risk rate 
employed and manner of readjusting PFPC’s capital structure to an 
all-equity model each appear to be contrary to agreed finance 
methodology.143  Additionally, some of the chosen numbers, such as 
the terminal value, perpetual growth rate, and final discount rate 
seem capricious.144  However, a critique of the Delaware court’s 
valuation practices, although certainly needed, is not the purpose of 
this Part.145  Rather, the goal here is to illustrate the issues outlined 
supra at Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 and the effect of an absence of any 
clear-cut valuation guidelines or standards and a body administering 
them.146  Practitioners and even the judiciary itself therefore apply 
their own subjective biases with no coherence to valuation using 
different “pick-and-choose” methods and approaches.147  The 
consequences are evidenced by the three quite different discounted 
cash flow figures ($21.35, $32.08, and $61.76) produced in 
Andaloro.148 
                                                          
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at *16. 
 143. See supra notes 112-142 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 122-142 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 106 for a citation of articles that have in part addressed this 
topic.   
 146. This is also illustrated by the comparable company analysis conducted by the 
Court of Chancery in Andaloro.  In Andaloro, the petitioner’s expert did not conduct a 
comparable company analysis for valuation purposes because he believed it was not 
feasible in light of PFPC’s past, poor performance and situation as well as the stock 
market decline in 2002.  2005 WL 2045640, at *15.  The respondent’s expert 
disagreed and did conduct such an analysis, as did Vice Chancellor Strine.  However, 
both Vice Chancellor Strine and respondent’s expert again came up with different 
numbers and used differing methodologies in deriving these numbers, albeit with 
some overlap.  Id. at *16-*20.  Vice Chancellor Strine then ascribed two-thirds weight 
to the discounted cash flow analysis and one-third weight to the comparable 
company analysis to derive an ultimate valuation of PFPC of $32.81.  Id. at *20.  He 
provided greater weight to the discounted cash flow analysis due to the presence of 
what he perceived as “responsible” management projections and the superiority of 
this technique for valuation purposes when such information is available.  Id.  The 
subjectivity problem here, even in this cursory summary, is again transparent. 
 147. The criticism here is not directed at Vice Chancellor Strine.  Rather, the 
opinion in Andaloro is meticulous and shows a judge struggling mightily (and 
admirably) to practice the art of valuation amidst highly divergent views and a lack of 
set guidelines or standards. 
 148. The results in Andaloro are also not the only examples in the Delaware 
appraisal context of the valuation disparities which can arise when valuation is 
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B. The Conflicts Problem 
The discretion and divergence in valuation practice outlined supra 
compounds a procedural concern with fairness opinion practice.  
The typical issuers of fairness opinions, investment banks, have been 
subject to repeated criticism for potential and actual conflicts in the 
rendering of these opinions.149  The primary issue is this:  investment 
banks delivering fairness opinions in a corporate control transaction 
typically are also retained to render general financial advice with 
respect to the relevant transaction.150  They are well-compensated for 
this work.  The fee can be millions of dollars:  the amount variant 
depending upon the transaction size.151  The manner of 
compensation is a success fee payable to the bank at transaction 
milestones such as announcement or completion.152  The 
compensation for a fairness opinion is often subsumed into this 
larger fee and is therefore also dependent upon the transaction’s 
occurrence.153  The investment bank therefore has a hefty incentive to 
ensure that the contemplated transaction for which it will issue a 
                                                          
conducted in these circumstances.  See, e.g., In re Emerging Communications, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that respondent’s expert 
calculated discounted cash flow of $10.38 per share and petitioners’ expert 
calculated discounted cash flow  of $41.16 per share; court calculated discounted 
cash flow value of $38.05 per share); Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 
1152338 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that respondent’s expert calculated going concern 
value of $20.00 per share and petitioners’ expert calculated going concern value of at 
least $35.00 per share; court valued corporation at $32.76 per share). 
 149. See infra at Parts III.B and III.D for a review of such criticism by regulators 
and academics; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Dealbook; Good Deals for Banks, Both 
Coming and Going, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, at C1 (criticizing conflicted practices by 
investment banks in the rendering of fairness opinions); Gretchen Morgenson, 
Mirror, Mirror, Who is the Unfairest, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at C31 (discussing 
regulator inquiries into conflicted fairness opinion practices by investment banks). 
 150. E.g., MAYTAG PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 63 (retaining an investment 
bank to render financial advice with approximately ninety percent of fee contingent 
upon success of the transaction); The Gillette Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 
DEFM14A), at 54, 56 (May 27, 2005) (retaining two investment banks to render 
financial advice with a substantial part of their fee contingent upon the success of the 
transaction) [hereinafter Gillette Proxy Statement]; AT&T PROXY STATEMENT, supra 
note 26, at 41 (retaining investment bank to render financial advice with 
approximately ninety-one percent of fee contingent upon success of the transaction).  
See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-67 (detailing the typical structure of 
investment bank financial advisory fees). 
 151. E.g., MAYTAG PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 63 (estimating fee paid to 
investment bank at approximately $17.4 million for financial advice and a fairness 
opinion); GILLETTE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 150, at 54, 56 (disclosing fee paid 
to two investment banks at $30 million each for financial advice and a fairness 
opinion); AT&T PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 41 (estimating fee paid to 
investment bank at $29 million for financial advice and a fairness opinion); PLAINS 
RESOURCES PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (estimating fee paid to investment 
bank at approximately $2.05 million for financial advice and a fairness opinion). 
 152. See supra note 151 for example transactions.   
 153. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-67. 
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fairness opinion progresses to completion.  But, conflict arises where 
a bank is asked to opine and advise on a transaction that it stands to 
benefit from only if the transaction transpires.  In fact, under the fee 
structure explicated above the bank will not be paid if it cannot find 
fairness.  This charge can be made even if the fairness opinion 
compensation is paid separate from the larger success fee.  If the 
transaction occurs, the remaining overall compensation is significant 
enough to raise conflict issues.154 
This explicit conflict is also accompanied by a more subtle one.  
The relationships between investment banks and corporate 
management can run deep, and an investment bank often has 
business with the corporation and its management that span more 
than one transaction.  In these situations, investment banks may be 
influenced to find a transaction fair to avoid irritating management 
and other corporate actors who stand to benefit from the 
transaction.155  This will ensure future lucrative business. 
Finally, there are other situations where investment banks do not 
do themselves proud.  For example, they often maintain business 
interests that extend to both sides of a corporate control transaction 
                                                          
 154. Even if separated out, fairness opinion fees themselves are often quite large 
and sustaining of an argument that incentives are misaligned.  See, e.g., In re Tele-
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that contingent fee payable to investment bank of 
approximately $40 million “creates a serious issue of material fact, as to whether 
[investment bank] . . . .  could provide independent advice to the Special 
Committee”).  In some instances, to refute this charge, the fee is payable whether or 
not the bank is able to render a fairness opinion.  E.g., PLAINS RESOURCES PROXY 
STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (disclosing that $1 million fee for fairness opinion is 
payable regardless of the conclusion expressed by the investment bank in the 
opinion).  However, many fee arrangements are dependent upon delivery of a 
fairness opinion.  E.g., 7 Eleven, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement 
(Form SC 14D9), at 3 (Sept. 19, 2005) (disclosing that a $1.25 million fee for a 
fairness opinion is due when opinion is delivered); NYSE Group, Inc., Registration 
Statement (Form S-4), at 78 (July 21, 2005) (disclosing that $500,000 of a $2 million 
fee for a fairness opinion was due upon execution of an engagement letter with the 
remaining $1.5 million due upon delivery of the opinion).  In addition, if the fee is 
not contingent upon a fairness determination, management and other pressures 
arguably still force investment banks towards the “right” fairness conclusion.  See infra 
note 155 (citing evidence of management influence on investment bank fairness 
opinions). 
 155. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., No. 12489, 1996 WL 
159628, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting evidence of investment bank revising its 
fairness opinion from negative to positive at management’s behest in order to secure 
future business); see also Timothy L. O’Brien, The Man With the Golden Slingshot, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2005, at C1 (describing the verdict of $1.45 billion issued to Ron L. 
Perelman’s affiliates against Morgan Stanley with respect to the acquisition of 
Coleman by Sunbeam based upon claims that the investment bank, advisor to 
Sunbeam, “conceal[ed] Sunbeam’s true financial condition” due to its lending 
relationship with Sunbeam and millions in fees earned). 
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and beyond their own opinion.156  The most common example today 
is stapled-financing.  In its most prominent form, an acquiree, in an 
auction situation, will offer the acquirer a financing package that is 
sponsored by the acquiree’s investment bank.157  This is termed 
stapled-financing.  The bank will render a fairness opinion to the 
acquiree board and, once the transaction is negotiated and agreed to, 
switch-sides and provide acquisition financing to the acquirer.158  The 
added conflict here, beyond the fact of dual-representation, is that 
the investment bank has an incentive for a lower target price so that 
the acquirer will not be over-leveraged after the acquisition and 
therefore be better positioned to repay the indebtedness incurred to 
the investment bank.159 
1. The search for meaning 
There are substantial criticisms outlined above that can be levied 
against the fairness opinion, but there are two important distinctions 
to be made in its defense.  First, in light of the criticism levied supra at 
Parts II.A and II.B, it would not be surprising if one completely 
discredited valuation analysis.  This would be incorrect.  Valuation 
today is an imperfect science; however, empirical research has proven 
that it can materially and beneficially inform as to value.160  
Furthermore, exact certainty as to price other than through market-
                                                          
 156. For example, when JP Morgan acquired Bank One in 2004 the fairness 
opinion for JP Morgan was rendered by JP Morgan itself.  Morgenson, supra note 
149; see also Sorkin, supra note 149 (criticizing investment banks who render fairness 
opinions while also participating in multiple aspects of the transaction). 
 157. See generally Ari Nathanson, Mid-Market I-Banks Keen On Stapled Financing, 
BUYOUTS, Sept. 5, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 14049532 (noting the increased use of 
stapled-financing). 
 158. See id. (explaining the incentives and benefits leading investment banks to 
provide stapled-financing). 
 159. See Sorkin, supra note 149 (criticizing acquiree-side investment banks who 
render fairness opinions and also provide stapled-financing); see also In re Toys “R’’ 
Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that board 
decision to permit post-agreement stapled-financing by investment bank who 
rendered fairness opinion to board was not inappropriate but “was unfortunate, in 
that it tends to raise eyebrows by creating the appearance of impropriety”).  In fact, 
due to the issues raised, both Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse now recommend that 
clients obtain a second, separate fairness opinion when the bank represents the 
acquiree and provides stapled-financing.  Michael J. Halloran & Jessica L. Hackman, 
Overview of Liability Issues Confronting Investment Banks:   Emphasis on Mergers and 
Acquisitions 9 No. 1 M & A LAWYER 20 (May 2005). 
 160. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 198-210 (outlining empirical 
studies finding utility of valuation techniques); GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73, 
at 158-68, 175-212 (outlining empirical tests finding utility of valuation techniques).  
See generally John Graham & Harvey Campbell, The Theory and Practice of Corporate 
Finance:   Evidence from the Field, 60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 187 (2001); Steven N. Kaplan & 
Richard S. Ruback, The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts:   An Empirical Analysis, 50 J. OF 
FIN. ECON. 1059 (1995). 
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based mechanisms will never be possible, but continuing research 
and study is making valuation practice and techniques more accurate 
every day.161  The issue in the fairness opinion context arises from the 
subjectivity inherent in this valuation process combined with the 
conflicted nature of the preparers and failure to follow best practices.  
However, an unconflicted valuation conducted with rigor and 
discipline in accordance with current academic precepts and without 
biased manipulation of subjective inputs can materially inform as to 
value.162 
Second, valuation can inform as to value but it is not a prediction 
of price.  There are numerous examples of fairness opinions 
rendered to acquirees in corporate control transactions where later 
offers emerged for higher, sometimes substantially higher, 
amounts.163  A recent investigation by the Massachusetts Secretary of 
the Commonwealth into the fairness opinion delivered to the board 
of Gillette in connection with its acquisition by Procter & Gamble 
(“P&G”) focused on whether Gillette’s investment banks violated the 
Massachusetts Security Act by issuing a fairness opinion in light of 
what the attorney general believed was the low price offered by 
P&G.164  It is this miscomprehension which often drives the criticism 
of fairness opinions:  the search for metaphysical certainty in 
valuation practice.  Yet, this is not the fairness opinion’s or valuation’s 
                                                          
 161. See supra note 14 (citing academic review of these developments). 
 162. See supra note 160 for citation of studies on the efficacy of valuation; see also 
DAMODARAN, supra note 74; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-68 (outlining rigorous, 
benchmark fairness opinion preparation procedures); Andrew L. Bab et al., Faulty 
Assumptions, THE DAILY DEAL, Sept. 3, 2004 (arguing that “[c]ritics of fairness 
opinions appear not only to misunderstand their purpose, but also to overlook the 
meticulous work and rigorous vetting that goes into them . . . .”).  
 163. There are literally hundreds of examples.  Two of recent note are first, 
Maytag’s agreement to be acquired by Whirlpool at a price of $21 after a prior 
agreement to be acquired for $14 a share.  Whirlpool Corp., Registration Statement 
(Form S-4), at 48, 57 (Sept. 29, 2005).  Second, Guidant’s agreement to be acquired 
by Boston Scientific at a price of $80 a share after a prior agreement to be acquired 
at approximately $64.  Guidant Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), 
at 86 (Mar. 3, 2006).  Fairness opinions were rendered to the acquiree with respect to 
the initial acquisition price in both instances. 
 164. GILLETTE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 150, at 40.  For further discussion of 
the Massachusetts investigation, see generally Brent Shearer, State Officials Get Tough On 
Regulation of M&A, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:   DEALMAKERS J., Aug. 1, 2005; Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, You Can Call It a Fairness Opinion, But That Wouldn’t Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2005, at C33 (reporting William F Galvin, Massachusetts secretary of state, 
has accused Gillette’s investment banks of rubber stamping a below-market sale 
price).  See also Andrew Caffey, Markey to Open Probe into Fairness Opinions, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 7, 2005, at D2 (stating “US Representative Edward J. Markey, Democrat 
of Malden, said he will investigate the so-called fairness opinions that investment 
banks issue to corporate clients in mergers and acquisitions”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Mergers:   Fair Should Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at C6 (discussing inherent 
conflicts with investment bank fairness opinions in corporate control transactions). 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
1590 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1557 
purpose.  In the corporate control transaction, fairness opinions do 
not exist to select the correct or even highest price that would or 
could be paid.  This is impossible given the limitations of valuation 
today, information disparities, and simple game theory.165  Rather, I 
believe the fairness opinion aids the board in satisfaction of its duty of 
care by providing confidence that the price offered for the sale or 
purchase of a corporation is within a reasonable range for a 
corporate control transaction of this nature.  This is not price. 
III. RESPONSE TO THE FAIRNESS OPINION 
This Part examines the fairness opinion post-Van Gorkom.  More 
specifically, it discusses the regulatory, judicial, and academic 
response to fairness opinions and their increased utilization.  First, I 
examine Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulatory 
action vis-à-vis fairness opinions both pre- and post-Van Gorkom.  
Thereafter, I survey the responses of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (“NASD”), Delaware courts, and academia. 
A. The SEC Response 
The SEC has adopted a disclosure-based approach to the treatment 
of fairness opinions in corporate control transactions.  The SEC has 
promulgated these disclosure requirements in two categories of 
takeover regulation:  going-private transactions166 and proxy 
solicitations.167  Surprisingly, the SEC has not proposed or otherwise 
extended these disclosure obligations to the cash tender offer.168 
In 1979, the SEC adopted rules governing going-private 
transactions by public companies and affiliated entities.169  The SEC 
                                                          
 165. See generally BREARLY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 716 (noting acquirer has 
information that is often unavailable publicly or to acquiree); Bernard Black, Bidder 
Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989) (arguing that acquirers tend to 
overpay in corporate control transactions); Carney, supra note 10, at 533-36 
(discussing limitations of valuation in the context of predicting the price an acquirer 
is willing or otherwise agrees to pay); Kenton K. Yee, Control Premiums, Minority 
Discounts, and Optimal Judicial Valuation, 48 J.L. & ECON. 517 (Oct. 2005) (reviewing 
methodology to calculate acquirer control premiums). 
 166. For a definition of a going-private transaction, see supra note 3. 
 167. The definition of “proxy” and a “solicitation” for purposes of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), are set forth in 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-1 (2005). 
 168. This is inexplicable.  If there is a need to disclose information concerning the 
fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction then the manner in which it is 
conducted (i.e., stockholder vote through a proxy solicitation or cash tender offer) 
should not affect the disclosure requirement. 
 169. Going-Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 82166 (Aug. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Going-Private Adopting Release]. 
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prescribed these rules in order to bestow added protections to 
unaffiliated stockholders due to their susceptibility for abuse in these 
transactions.170  In these rules, the SEC set forth the first meaningful, 
explicit requirement under the federal securities laws for public 
disclosure of fairness opinions and their underlying analyses.  
Additionally, the new going-private rules mandated disclosure 
concerning potential conflicts-of-interest for any investment bank 
rendering a fairness opinion in such transactions.171 
The SEC set forth these strictures in new Rule 13e-3.172  Rule 13e-3 
required, and still requires, that a corporation or affiliate thereof 
implementing a Rule 13e-3 going-private transaction be subject to the 
increased disclosure and filing obligations set forth in Schedule 13e-
3.173  Schedule 13e-3 obligates the filer to disclose whether or not the 
corporation or its affiliate has received a fairness opinion or similar 
report, and, if so, to furnish a summary of the fairness opinion.174  In 
addition, the fairness opinion must be filed as an exhibit to the 
Schedule.175  The Schedule also requires that any underlying written 
analyses (e.g., the board book), or any other report prepared by the 
investment bank in connection with the fairness opinion, must be 
attached as an exhibit to the Schedule.176 
The Schedule 13e-3 fairness opinion summary disclosure 
requirements are not specific:  they require disclosure of the bases for 
and methods of arriving at the finding of fairness but do not provide 
any guidance as to the scope or content of this mandated 
disclosure.177  However, the SEC staff review of, and comment upon, 
Schedule 13e-3s has provided such definition.  More specifically, 
                                                          
 170. See Going-Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 81366, at 88736-39 (Nov. 17, 1977) (outlining various prior abusive 
practices undertaken by affiliates in going-private transactions) [hereinafter Going-
Private Proposing Release]. 
 171. See GOING-PRIVATE ADOPTING RELEASE, supra note 169, at 82124-25. 
 172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2005); see also GOING-PRIVATE ADOPTING RELEASE, supra 
note 169, at 82125-31 (providing an overview of Rule 13e-3’s requirements). 
 173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d) (2005). 
 174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e) (2005). 
 175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 16). 
 176. Id.  This can be interpreted to include oral reports delivered to the board; see 
Applicability of Item 9 of Schedule 13E-3 to Purchase Price Allocation Reports, SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108650 (Sept. 30, 1987) (requiring  “oral presentation 
[to] be summarized fairly” and filed as an exhibit to the Schedule 13E-3).  Drafts of 
fairness opinions, board books and other analyses provided to the board may also 
require disclosure.  The staff of the SEC has been known to query whether such 
drafts were provided to the board and to require disclosure of any material 
differences in these drafts and the final versions.  Meredith M. Brown & Gregory V. 
Gooding, What’s Different About Going-Private, 13 No. 8 INSIGHTS 14, 16 (Sept. 1999). 
 177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 9). 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
1592 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1557 
since 1979, the staff of the SEC has regularly interpreted Schedule 
13e-3 to require disclosure of the methodologies utilized in preparing 
a fairness opinion, the results of such methodologies, and the basis 
for selecting each one.178  The extent of this obligatory disclosure has 
varied with the intensity of SEC review but has commonly tracked the 
disclosure made by investment banks in their board books.179  In this 
regard, the staff of the SEC has most frequently required disclosure 
of the discount rates and terminal value used in a discounted cash 
flow analysis and the companies referenced in a comparable 
company’s analysis.180  However, rarely has the SEC staff gone further 
and required disclosure of all material inputs in the selected 
calculations, such as  requiring full disclosure of the method of 
computation of the discount rate in a discounted cash flow analysis.181 
Schedule 13e-3 also requires disclosure of certain potential 
investment banking conflicts.  The Schedule mandates disclosure of 
“any material relationship that existed during the past two years or is 
mutually understood to be contemplated . . . .” between the 
corporation receiving the fairness opinion and the investment bank 
rendering the fairness opinion and each of their affiliates.182  The 
“compensation received or to be received” by the investment bank as 
a result of any such relationship must also be disclosed.183  SEC staff 
review has again delineated the true contours of this disclosure.  
However, this review has been hit or miss.  While the staff has 
sometimes required full disclosure of relationship details as well as 
monetary and other compensation provided,184 it has also frequently 
permitted boiler-plate responses.  This boiler-plate typically was 
descriptive rather than numerical and did not detail the true nature 
                                                          
 178. Edward D. Herlihy et al., Disclosure of the Analyses Underlying Investment Banker 
Fairness Opinions, 6 No. 3 INSIGHTS 11, 11 (1992). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Shopko Stores, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 
64 (Nov. 23, 2005); Brookstone, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), 
at 50-51 (Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Brookstone Proxy Statement]; WORLDWIDE 
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 17-18; SUNGARD PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 92, 
at 34-35, 40-41.  Thus, while filers might do otherwise voluntarily, SEC disclosure 
requirements under Rule 13e-3 have generally been limited to disclosure of the 
analyses set forth in the board book.  But see Vermont Teddy Bear, Inc., Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 41-42 (Sept. 20, 2005) (disclosing cash flow 
numbers discounted and choice of the CAPM to calculate return on equity as well as 
the risk free rate, market risk premium and Beta utilized in the CAPM calculation). 
 182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 9). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See, e.g., PLAINS RESOURCES PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (disclosing 
that the investment bank “has in the past provided financial advisory services to 
Plains Resources and, since 2000, has received fees totaling $2,845,000 for such 
services”). 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
2006] FAIRNESS OPINIONS 1593 
and extent of the investment bank and corporate relationship, past 
and present, nor the amount of compensation received by the 
investment bank.185 
In 1986, the SEC comprehensively revised the proxy rules and 
adopted stated disclosure requirements for fairness opinions 
provided in corporate control transactions similar to those within 
Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13e-3.186  The only notable difference was 
that these revised proxy rules did not mandate disclosure of board 
books and other related financial analyses delivered by an investment 
bank to the board.187  However, while the explicated rules were 
similar, the staff of the SEC adopted a different approach in its 
implementing review.  The SEC staff, in fact, took a “hands-off” 
position of no review at all.188  Accordingly, until the early 1990s, 
disclosure in proxy statements with respect to fairness opinions was 
quite limited and typically confined to a summary of the opinion 
itself.189  However, in the early 1990s, the SEC staff revised these 
practices, initiating rigorous review on level with SEC review of 
Schedule 13e-3 statements and requiring similar disclosure.190  The 
SEC did not, either in the early 1990s or thereafter, state a reason for 
this shift. 
 In more recent times, the SEC has again reverted to a more 
relaxed review process for proxy statements.  As a result, the majority 
of proxy statement filers in corporate control transaction today 
disclose only bare information with respect to the assumptions 
underlying the fairness opinion valuation analyses—this is oftentimes 
the discount rates and terminal value methodology utilized for a 
discounted cash flow analysis and the companies referenced for a 
comparable companies analysis.  Filers also now often make boiler-
plate disclosure that describes fees and relationships as “customary” 
                                                          
 185. See, e.g., SINOPEC SCHEDULE 13E-3, supra note 31, at Ex. A(5)(v), p.36 (Jan. 20, 
2005) (disclosing that investment bank received a “customary” fee for rendering the 
fairness opinion); BROOKSTONE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 181, at 52 (disclosing 
that investment bank provided services to “affiliates of the members of the investor 
group” for unspecified “compensation”). 
 186. Proxy Rules—Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23789 
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83901 (Nov. 10, 1986).  The 
SEC also adopted similar rules for Form S-4 registration statements filed in 
connection with securities offerings involving a corporate control transaction under 
Rule 145 or an exchange offer.  Id. 
 187. However, since the early 1990s the SEC has often requested confidential 
submission of board books to ensure that the fairness opinion public disclosure is 
consistent with the book’s contents.  Herlihy et al., supra note 178, at 11-12. 
 188. Id. at 12-13. 
 189. Id. at 11. 
 190. See id. at 13 (discussing the SEC’s increased proxy statement disclosure 
requirements for fairness opinions).     
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and as existent, rather than disclosing specific numbers or the details 
of relationships.  This has been true at times even of the fee paid for 
the fairness opinion itself.191   In light of this backsliding and back-
and-forth, public pronouncement of the SEC staff’s policy on fairness 
opinion disclosure would be helpful for consistency’s sake, if nothing 
else.    
The SEC has not provided any justification for the aforementioned 
disclosure obligations other than a single statement in the going-
private proposing release that the fairness opinion disclosure 
requirements adopted therein “are intended to ensure full disclosure 
concerning the material elements in the determination of the 
consideration to be offered . . . .”192  Beyond this, it can be surmised 
that the SEC adopted these disclosure obligations to align with the 
general tenor of the new going-private rules—providing stockholders 
with information as to price equivalent to that placed before the 
board in a going-private transaction and sufficient for an educated 
stockholder investment decision.193  This would conceivably limit the 
potential for abuse of these stockholders by an affiliate or the 
corporation itself.194  The rationale for SEC extension of these 
strictures in the revised proxy rules has never been stated but is 
presumably based in part upon these same principles. 
Nor has the SEC ever recognized or even acknowledged any issues 
with fairness opinion practice or assessed the intrinsic worth of these 
opinions.  Instead, the SEC disclosure requirements ab initio assumed 
the fairness opinion’s significance and the usefulness of at least 
partial disclosure of the underlying valuation analyses.  In addition, 
beyond the disclosure requirements enumerated above, the SEC has 
never addressed the issue of investment banks rendering fairness 
opinions and their potential conflicted status.  The absence on both 
counts is a bit puzzling since such recognition should presumably 
form the foundation for any rule-making on this subject.  
Nevertheless, this is what has unfolded. 
                                                          
   191.  See, e.g., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 
DEFM14A), at 24-25 (Jan. 3, 2006) (stating that investment bank “in the past ha[s] 
provided, and in the future may provide, investment banking and other financial 
services” to acquiree and that it would received a “customary” fee for its services for 
the current fairness opinion); American Water Works, Inc., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 26 (Dec. 5, 2001) (disclosing that the investment 
bank was paid a “customary” fee for the fairness opinion and advisory services). 
 192. GOING-PRIVATE PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 170, at 88752. 
 193. Id. at 88750-53. 
 194. See id. at 88738 (arguing that SEC regulation of going-private transactions is 
necessary to maintain full investor confidence in the U.S. capital markets). 
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B. The National Association of Securities Dealers Response 
The only other significant regulatory action with respect to fairness 
opinions has been the recent, in-progress rule-making of the NASD.195  
In November 2004, the NASD promulgated a notice to members 
requesting comment on whether to propose new rules “that would 
address procedures, disclosure requirements, and conflicts of interest 
when members provide fairness opinions in corporate control 
transactions.”196  More specifically, the NASD requested comments 
concerning methods to “improve the processes by which investment 
banks render fairness opinions and manage inherent conflicts.”197  
The NASD put forth three reasons for requesting comment.  First, 
the disclosure mandated under SEC regulation for fairness opinions 
could be perceived as insufficient “to inform investors about the 
subjective nature of some opinions and their potential biases.”198  
Second, fairness opinions are by nature subjective and consequently 
there has arisen a “perceived tendency” that these opinions often 
support management.199  Finally, unaffiliated stockholders sometimes 
do not receive the benefits in a corporate control transaction that 
management, directors or other employees do.  The NASD 
hypothesized that this disparity may create biases in favor of the 
transaction if the people involved in the current or future hiring of 
the investment bank are those with a differential benefit.200 
The NASD subsequently proposed rule 2290 in response to 
solicited member comments.201  Rule 2290 was announced and filed 
with the SEC for approval on June 22, 2005, and, in response to SEC 
                                                          
 195. The NASD is a self-regulating organization, and the private regulator of the 
U.S. securities industry.  Every securities firm doing business with the American 
public must register with the NASD, and all of the bulge-bracket, multi-function 
investment banks and most other investment banks are members of the NASD and 
subject to its regulation.  See generally Maria A. Volarich, Note, Easing the Regulation of 
a Pan-European Securities Market:   Applying the Recommendations of the Rudman Report to 
Easdaq, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2230, 2241-44 (1996) (outlining the history and role of 
the NASD).  The SEC has oversight of, and ability to regulate, the NASD under 
Section 19 of the Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (2005). 
 196. Request For Comment—Fairness Opinions Issued by Members, NASD Notice 
to Members 04-83, at 1009 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nasd.com/ 
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249. 
 197. Id. at 1012. 
 198. Id. at 1011. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1012. 
 201. Proposed Rule Change to Establish New NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness 
Opinions, SR-NASD-2005-080 (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/ 
web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_014559.  The NASD 
received twenty comment letters, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?Idc 
Service=SSGET_ PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249&ssTargetNodeId=567. 
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comments, amended three times.202  The rule was published in the 
Federal Register on April 11, 2006.203  It is currently in a comment 
period, and will likely be approved by the SEC in the coming months, 
thereby becoming effective under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended.204 
Rule 2290 in its current form sets forth requirements for the 
disclosure of potential conflicts and minimum procedures with 
respect to NASD member investment bank’s internal approval and 
vetting of fairness opinions.205  The rule is primarily one of mandated 
disclosure triggered only if a fairness opinion is provided or otherwise 
referenced to public stockholders.  In such a situation, four 
categories of disclosure are required.  First, all compensation payable 
to the member investment bank that is contingent upon the 
successful completion of the transaction must be disclosed in the 
fairness opinion.206  Second, any material relationship that existed 
during the two years prior to the rendering of the fairness opinion or 
is contemplated between the companies involved in the transaction 
and the member investment bank must be disclosed in the fairness 
opinion.207  Third, the fairness opinion must state whether or not it 
has been approved or issued by a fairness committee.208  Finally, the 
fairness opinion must disclose the categories of information that 
formed a substantial basis for the fairness opinion and whether any 
such information in each such category was independently verified by 
the member investment bank.209   
The rule in its current proposed form is largely uneventful and a 
disappointment given the NASD acknowledgement of the issues 
before it.210  The procedural requirements for internal fairness 
                                                          
   202.  Amendment Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to Proposed Rule Change to Establish New 
NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness Opinions, SR-NASD-2005-080 (Nov. 30, 2005), 
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDoc 
Name=NASDW014559 . 
  203.  Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 
thereto to Establish New NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness Opinions, 71 Fed. Reg. 
34-53598 (Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Change Regarding Fairness 
Opinions]. 
  204.  This is legally required under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act.  15 
U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (2005).   
  205.  PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 
18395 (Proposed Rule 2290). 
  206.  Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(1), (2)). 
  207.  Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(3)). 
  208.  Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(5)). 
  209.  Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(4)). 
  210.  Several commentators argued for stronger medicine, including prohibiting 
investment banks from receiving success fees if rendering a fairness opinion, 
requiring disclosure of all material inputs in the preparation of any underlying 
valuation analysis, requiring distinct disclosure of fairness opinion fees from general 
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opinion approval are, with one significant exception, already largely 
followed voluntarily by the investment banks.211  This exception is a 
provision requiring a regulated investment bank rendering a fairness 
opinion to follow a procedure which evaluates “whether the amount 
and nature of the compensation from the transactions underlying the 
fairness opinion benefiting any individual officers, directors or 
employees, or class of such persons, relative to the benefits to 
shareholders of the company is a factor in reaching a fairness 
determination.”212  I have read and re-read this provision and the 
NASD commentary upon it.  While the purpose can be easily 
surmised—addressing inordinate retention and compensation paid 
in connection with change of control transactions—I look forward to 
learning how the investment banks implement this provision, because 
I honestly do not know how they can or will other than via the usual 
boiler-plate response.  In any event, this requirement misapprehends 
what a fairness opinion does and opines to.  Retention and other 
compensatory arrangements do arguably result in a lower price to 
acquiree stockholders, but do not affect whether the ultimate price 
itself is fair within the financial parameters of the value of the 
corporation or the consideration paid.  To rephrase the point, the 
price can be financially fair in a corporate control transaction but the 
retention and other compensatory arrangements still egregious.  
Trying to analyze them together scrambles the egg.213  The NASD 
should address these issues separately.   
 The disclosure requirements of the rule were watered down in the 
NASD and SEC review process.  The NASD ultimately did not go so 
far as to require member investment banks to disclose “any significant 
conflicts of interest” as it initially considered.214  Instead, the 
disclosure requirements with respect to contingent consideration and 
                                                          
advisory fees and the adoption of a code of best practices for fairness opinion 
preparation.  See inter alia comments of CalPERS (submitted Feb. 1, 2005), Charles 
M. Elson et al. (submitted Dec. 21, 2004) and Standard & Poor’s Corporate Value 
Consulting (submitted Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/ 
idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249&ssTargetNodeId=56; 
see also Ann Davis, Wall Street's ‘Fairness Opinions’ Draw Fire From Calpers, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 8, 2005, at C1 (discussing CalPERs comments on the NASD proposed Rule 
2290). 
  211.  PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 
18395 (Rule 2290(b)).   
  212.  PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 
18395 (Rule 2290(b)(3)). 
  213.  The issue of fairness opinions and retention and compensatory arrangements 
is discussed further supra note 27.   
  214.  PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 
18397. 
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relationships largely overlap with current federal securities law.215  
The two other disclosure obligations concerning opinion committees 
and independent verification of information will likely be met with 
more boiler-plate responses—a practice which the rule effectively 
permits.216  Furthermore, in the amending releases the NASD also 
relaxed the rule’s bite; removing a good bit of the potential for it to 
go beyond SEC regulation.  For example, the NASD took the position 
in the amending releases that disclosure of contingent compensation 
and material relationships under the rule can be descriptive and not 
quantitative; a statement as to whether it exists or not sufficient.217   
Yet, the number is the important element here:  if the amount is high 
it has more potential to result in bias.218    In addition, the rule does 
nothing about the subjectivity inherent in fairness opinion 
preparation.  It simply addresses the conflicts issue with redundant 
disclosure requirements, which permit investment banks to engage in 
the similar practices with little, if any change. 
However, there is hope.  The NASD has achieved something the 
SEC has not.  The NASD has actually recognized problems with 
fairness opinion practice today.  It is here that I believe the value of 
these new NASD rules will ultimately lie, in their unrealized potential 
and significance in the recognition by a regulator of underlying 
problems with fairness opinion practice and the limited regulation 
thereof put forth by the SEC.  The SEC and other corporate actors 
now have no excuse:  the NASD has put them on notice. 
C. The Delaware Courts Response 
1. The fairness opinion’s enduring strength 
Steadfast would be a good description of the Delaware courts’ 
treatment of fairness opinions post-Van Gorkom.  The courts have 
                                                          
  215.  See supra Part III.A (outlining federal securities law fairness opinion 
disclosure requirements).  The rule requires disclosure of “material relationships” 
between the member investment bank and all of the companies involved in the 
transaction, as opposed to the federal requirement that only relationships with the 
fairness opinion recipient need be disclosed.  However, contrary to the federal 
requirement, the rule does not require that relationships between the investment 
bank’s affiliates and the fairness opinion recipient be disclosed.  See PROPOSED RULE 
CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 18397. 
  216.  PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 
18398. 
  217.  Id. at 18397. 
  218.  This is particularly true, since, unless forced by SEC staff comments, filers 
arguably do not need to disclose these numbers.  See supra notes 185-191.  See also In 
re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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explicitly and repeatedly clung to Van Gorkom’s holding that a well-
prepared financial analysis from either management or an outside 
advisor is necessary but that a fairness opinion is not.  So, for 
example, the Court of Chancery recently stated that in the corporate 
control transaction “fairness opinions . . . are generally not essential, 
as a matter of law, to support an informed business judgment,”219 a 
statement that had been reiterated by the Delaware courts 
throughout the preceding twenty years.220 
However, the Delaware courts’ assertions that a fairness opinion is 
not explicitly required in connection with the board’s consideration 
of a corporate control transaction have been undermined by the 
credence and weight paid by the courts to fairness opinions in such 
paradigms.  In case after case where a board’s decision-making 
process has been challenged, the Delaware courts have noted the 
receipt of a fairness opinion, in and of itself, as a strong, if not 
dispositive, indicator that the board properly acted in making the 
relevant decision to proceed with the transaction.221  More broadly, 
the courts have repeatedly and approvedly cited fairness opinions as 
sufficing to provide protection from liability under title 8, section 
141(e) of the Delaware Code.222  In both instances, this endorsement 
has come without significant qualification or analysis such that the 
                                                          
 219. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 220. See, e.g., Merchants’ Nat’l Props., Inc. v. Meyerson, 2000 WL 1041229, at *6 
(Del. Ch. 2000); Wacht v. Cont’l Hosts, Ltd., 1994 WL 525222, at *3 (Del. Ch. 1994); 
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 472 (Del. 1991). 
 221. See, e.g., In re Compucom Systems, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2005 WL 2481325, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding board reasonably relied on fairness opinions which 
“were supported by a number of financial analyses”); Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. 
Allied Riser Commc’ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting concerns as 
to the fairness of the transaction as a whole, but taking no action as the investment 
bank “has not withdrawn its fairness opinion nor has it told [the corporation] that it 
may no longer rely upon it”); Ash v. McCall, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(stating that retainment and advice of investment bank, together with accounting 
firm, “permits one conclusion:   that the [corporation’s] directors’ reliance on the 
views expressed by their advisors was in good faith” and therefore the board acted 
with due care); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(noting with approval receipt of fairness opinion to sustain rejection of claim that 
board breached its duty of care).  See generally In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, 
Inc., 1999 WL 350473, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that “an outside financial 
advisor’s opinion on the terms of a transaction generally gives the court comfort with 
respect to the reasonableness of the board’s action”); Adam O. Emmerich & Paul K. 
Rowe, Acquisitions Gone Sour:   Whose Fault?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at S4 (asserting 
that “if the acquiring firm’s board is advised by independent financial and legal 
professionals who ‘green light’ the transaction, the directors will be protected from 
litigation challenging their pre-closing conduct”).  Cf. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing pendent 
Delaware state law claims of breach of the duty of care due to, among other factors, 
the board’s receipt of a fairness opinion). 
 222. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners, 846 A.2d at 985; In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at * 16 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
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receipt of a fairness opinion appears, absent egregious factors, to per 
se provide protection.223  Obviously, from the board and practitioner 
perspective the consequence is to sustain the implicit structural 
requirement for these opinions. 
The Delaware courts have also looked to these opinions as a 
substantive determinator that can guide them in their own fairness 
determinations.  For example, in Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., Inc.,224 
the Court of Chancery, conducting an entire fairness analysis, stated 
that in a going-private transaction, a board of directors has no legal 
obligation to obtain a fairness opinion, but that the employment of 
such a “procedural safeguard” will be seen as strong evidence of a fair 
transaction.225  The ostensible result of the opinion’s caveat has been 
to ensure a strong, if not mandatory, role for a fairness opinion in a 
board recommended going-private transaction.  However, it is also 
yet another example of the high place Delaware courts have accorded 
fairness opinions as stand-alone instruments.226 
The Delaware courts have at times acted in this manner without 
any searching examination of the analyses underlying the opinion or 
even the utility of the underlying valuation.227  They also have not, 
                                                          
 223. The Delaware courts have at times noted that a fairness opinion that is 
unreasonably relied or acted upon in bad faith is not sufficient to establish the 
protections of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).  Yet, cases criticizing fairness 
opinions that have actually found such lack of reliance or bad faith are few and far 
between, and criticism of fairness opinions in the Delaware courts has more often 
occurred in the context of a failure to disclose deficiencies in the preparation of the 
fairness opinion rather than in its use.  See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988) (holding that to rely upon DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141(e) (2001), a board “may not avoid its active and direct duty of oversight in a 
matter as significant as the sale of corporate control”); Grubb v. Bagley, 1998 WL 
92224, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1998) (holding that the statute insulates director’s from 
liability when relying on a fairness opinion only if the board acts “reasonably in good 
faith,” and that reasonable and good faith reliance are material issues of fact). 
 224. 1996 WL 159626, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 225. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). 
 226. See, e.g., In re Tele-Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig. 2005 WL 3642727, at 
*14 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that defendant’s had failed to demonstrate fair price 
due to board’s failure to obtain a fairness opinion analyzing the fairness of the high-
vote stock exchange ratio to the holders of high-vote stock and the fairness of the 
low-vote stock exchange ratio to the holders of low-vote stock where two classes of 
stock existed, one high-vote and the other low-vote); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 
768 A.2d 492, 505 n.55 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The board’s reliance upon an investment 
banker (whose independence and qualifications are not challenged in the 
complaint) is another factor weighing against the plaintiffs’ ability to state an 
actionable claim that the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duties by 
failing to secure the highest value reasonably attainable.”); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n 
Sys., Inc., 1995 WL 301403, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1995) (noting fairness opinions are 
“further evidence of the fairness of the price offered”). 
 227. To be fair, the Delaware courts have at times in the past criticized fairness 
opinions when their preparation was blatantly deficient.  These cases, though, are 
largely from the 1980s.  See, e.g., Associated Imports, Inc. v. ASG Indus., Inc., 1984 
WL 19833, at *7-*8 (Del. Ch. 1984) (criticizing investment bank for acting as a 
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until recently, made any substantive recognition, beyond Van 
Gorkom’s implicit distinction, between the opinion itself and the 
valuation forming the basis of such an opinion.228 Instead, it can be 
alleged that the Delaware courts have often endowed the fairness 
opinion with an almost magical status and ability to act as a golden 
ticket, alleviating an insouciant board from liability and the 
transaction at hand from challenges regarding the price aspect of the 
board’s duty of care. 
However, the Court of Chancery recently deviated in part from this 
practice.  In In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig.,229 Vice Chancellor 
Strine gave voice to the first Delaware Court of Chancery opinion to 
recognize that the fairness opinion is merely a lightning rod and 
fundamentally a function of the underlying analyses.  He stated: 
[C]ourts must be candid in acknowledging that the disclosure of 
the banker’s “fairness opinion” alone and without more, provides 
stockholders with nothing other than a conclusion, qualified by a 
gauze of protective language designed to insulate the banker from 
liability.  The real informative value of the banker’s work is not in 
its bottom-line conclusion, but in the valuation analysis that 
buttresses that result.230 
Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that this information was 
material to an acquiree stockholder’s informed investment decision 
as to whether the price in a going-private transaction was appropriate 
and, consequently, whether or not to accept the offer.231  He 
accordingly held that, in the context of a going-private transaction 
involving a Delaware corporation, a fair summary of the analyses 
supporting the acquiree fairness opinion must be disclosed in the 
related tender offer documentation.232 
This case marked the first true recognition by the Delaware courts 
of the role of the fairness opinion, the underlying analyses as key to 
the fairness opinion’s value, and the distinction between the two.233  
However, In re Pure Resources was at its heart a disclosure case which 
                                                          
“negotiator” rather than an “expert” by preparing two separate fairness opinion 
letters for delivery at a board meeting, one of which was blank); Joseph v. Shell Oil 
Co., 482 A.2d 335, 343 (Del. Ch. 1984) (criticizing the failure of tender offer 
materials to disclose that fairness opinion had been prepared after only eight days of 
scrutiny); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (finding a lack of 
fair dealing where corporation failed to disclose “cursorily” prepared fairness 
opinion which was brought to the board meeting with the price left blank). 
 228. See infra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.   
 229. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 230. Id. at 449. 
 231. Id. at 449-50. 
 232. Id. at 449. 
 233. Id. 
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arose due to the SEC’s illogical failure to maintain similar disclosure 
requirements for fairness opinions in cash tender offers as in proxy 
solicitations and going-private transactions.234  The Delaware Court of 
Chancery held that in the absence of such federal obligation, 
Delaware law required such disclosure in the going-private, cash 
tender offer context.235 
Ultimately, it is uncertain what this holding’s implications are for 
fairness opinions and the weight paid to them under Delaware 
jurisprudence.  This is particularly true since the Delaware courts, 
even in In re Pure Resources, have remained resolutely confident in the 
worth of the valuation processes underlying a fairness opinion.236  
This is true despite repeated examples thrust upon these courts of 
the arguable flaws in valuation practice, the embedded investment 
banking conflicts inherent in the rendering of these services, and the 
sometimes poor, and possibly negligent, practices by investment 
banks.237  Rather, the courts have continued to pay high regard to, 
and placed confidence in, valuation techniques and their ability as 
currently practiced to find meaningful prices and value ranges.  The 
holding of In re Pure Resources is but one such example.  Another is 
found in Delaware appraisal and entire fairness proceedings where 
valuation techniques are routinely utilized by the Delaware courts 
themselves and the experts who appear before them.238  Here, the 
courts have not only placed confidence in these practices as currently 
conducted but endorsed a view that the courts are quite capable as 
the sole arbiter in these matters.239  Former Chief Judge Veasey of the 
Delaware Supreme Court expressed this mindset best when he stated: 
The laborious process of trying an appraisal case in the Court of 
Chancery, with its “battle of the experts” tendency, requires 
patience and an intellectually disciplined approach by the trial 
judge.  As one can glean by reading the recent Court of Chancery 
                                                          
 234. See supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of this failing. 
 235. In re Pure Resources, 808 A.2d 421, 449-50 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
 236. See, e.g., id. at 449 (stating that the work of an investment bank is supported 
by the “work of the judiciary itself, which closely examines the underlying analyses 
performed by the investment bankers”). 
 237. See supra Part II for a discussion of these practices. 
 238. See supra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of one such example. 
 239. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. 2000) (holding 
that appraisal proceedings must be entirely conducted by the judges of the Court of 
Chancery and therefore “the use of masters to determine the ultimate valuation are 
not permitted by the present statutory appraisal scheme”); Gonsalves v. Straight 
Arrow Publishers, 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997) (holding that the Court of Chancery 
is required to “independently determine the value of the shares that are the subject 
of the appraisal action”).  This approach in appraisal proceedings has been partially 
fostered upon the courts by the terms of the Delaware appraisal statute itself.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2005). 
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appraisal cases, there is much for bankers, M&A lawyers, and 
corporate officials (including directors) to learn and apply in any 
major M&A transaction.  It would be a wise step for the participants 
in such transactions to review and analyze some of the cases . . . .240 
Thus, in the world-view of the Delaware courts, the issues raised 
supra at Part II are not particularly relevant for placing the fairness 
opinion’s role in the corporate control transaction.  Valuation, as 
practiced today, is not only a reliable indicator of both price and 
value, but the Delaware courts are a first choice for conducting these 
machinations.  The fairness opinion itself has equivalent status as a 
reflection of these analyses to the extent that any distinguishment is 
even attempted.  The consequences of this attitude and perspective 
are not surprising; the Delaware courts have repeatedly relied, 
without material question, upon the fairness opinion as a virtually 
required, reliable, and useful mainstay in a corporate control 
transaction in satisfaction of the board’s duty of care. 
2. The fairness opinion’s context  
Interestingly, the role of the fairness opinion in the Delaware 
takeover regime—other than as an essentially obligatory requirement 
in satisfaction of the board’s duty of care—has never been explored 
by the Delaware courts.  The Delaware courts, post-Van Gorkom, have 
erected in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,241 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,242 Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.243 and other cases a takeover 
regime that permits a corporation to “just say no” and effectively 
refuse a takeover offer.244  In addition, the Delaware courts have 
established a takeover code, which permits an acquiree to agree to 
deal protection devices.245  Theoretically, these devices could differ 
depending upon the sale posture, i.e., through a full or modified 
auction or upon agreement with one bidder subject to a post-
agreement market check.  However, in none of these circumstances 
did the Delaware court address whether variance of the sale process 
                                                          
 240. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1495. 
 241. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 242. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 243. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
 244. See generally Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox:  The Delaware Supreme Court’s 
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).   
 245. Discussion of the Delaware takeover regime, its parameters and argued 
failings is legion.  For two more interesting and current articles, see Marcel Kahan & 
Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:   Adaptive Responses to 
Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Professorial Bear 
Hug:   The ESB Proposal as a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware Courts Confront the 
Basic “Just Say No” Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863 (2002). 
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and structure of the transaction should alter or affect the necessary 
requirement for an acquiree fairness opinion or financial analysis. 
The Delaware courts have also never examined within the overall 
takeover regime, or otherwise, the why or when of their virtual 
requirement for a fairness opinion and actual requirement of an 
underlying valuation.  The courts have simply stated that this is an 
obligation in satisfaction of the duty of care.246  This is a failing:  the 
analyses or fairness opinion are simply a means to inform an acquiree 
board as to whether a price offered is within an appropriate range of 
values.247  However, as briefly noted supra at Part II.C, an appropriate 
price, upon a board- or stockholder-initiated decision to sell, is one 
set by the effective market.248  Absent other factors, the resulting price 
                                                          
 246. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). 
 247. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.  
 248. The academic and judicial communities are generally in agreement that in a 
perfect market this is the correct conclusion for not only price but as a fundamental 
guidepost for structuring a legal takeover regime.  See Allen, supra note 106, at 561-62 
(discussing the effect of market prices on the takeover code structure); see also 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:   A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383 (1970) (outlining the various forms of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (examining the underlying reasons for the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis and its consequences for the legal system).  
However, this harmony disappears if the market or derived price is perceived as 
either imperfect or inefficient.  In this regard, there is no consensus as to whether 
and when the market is efficient and its implication for value and price.  In addition, 
in circumstances where the market is possibly inefficient, there is no consensus 
concerning the extent to which market-based mechanisms can and should suffice as 
a true indicator of price within a legal takeover regime.  See ROBERT SHILLER, 
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 171-90 (2001) (arguing against the efficient markets 
hypothesis due to numerous contrary indicators); Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence 
in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 942-49 (2002) (discussing the debate and 
arguing that market-based prices are the superior method of valuation and price 
determination).  I think it is fair to say that the answer lies somewhere in the middle, 
which is that market-based prices are the truest indicator of value.  But see Rapid-
American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (“Recent price changes in 
the stock market dramatically illustrate the defects of an overstated reliance on market 
price to determine a corporation’s intrinsic value in an appraisal proceeding.”) 
(citing Application of Del. Racing Ass’n, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965)).  However, 
for purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to wade into the deeper debate 
concerning how efficient the market is and its implications for a takeover code.  
Rather, once a corporation makes a decision to sell, the only question should be the 
appropriate legal and procedural mechanisms necessary to achieve the highest price 
reasonably available.  See infra note 249 (discussing this standard and dovetailing it 
with what is a “fair” price).  The aim of any takeover code should be to encourage 
such resultant prices, and I would argue that an auction-based process is the most 
effective mechanism to produce such a price.  However, where an effective market-
based price is not possible due to market failures, such as in going-private 
transactions, or market inefficiencies price may be achieved or validated through 
other means.  The underlying question is then the level of court supervision or legal 
regulation necessary to ensure that the non-market-based price is one that is “fair.”  
Relatedly, there is also the question of how ineffective the market must be before 
non-market-based measures are introduced, and a consequent assessment in such 
cases of the trade-off between monitoring and regulation and a less market-based 
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arrived at through such a mechanism would be a fair one to the 
acquiree’s stockholders.249  The Delaware courts have never truly 
recognized this in their takeover jurisprudence, particularly in the 
fairness opinion context.250  In fact, they have never acknowledged 
any definition of fairness for purposes of a fairness opinion.  Instead, 
fairness opinions in the Delaware takeover regime have been 
endowed with independent worth and significance.  This results in 
needless redundancy.  It does not recognize that the opinion 
mandate is inherently circular—a fairness opinion opines to a result 
if a process were followed, yet at the same time is required even if the 
process is so adhered to. 
This is important.  The Delaware courts have set up a system that 
virtually requires an acquiree board of directors in a corporate 
control situation to obtain these opinions in order to satisfy the 
board’s duty of care.  Yet, in doing so, the Delaware courts have 
assumed that these opinions can definitively validate a given 
negotiated price.251  In fact, under Delaware law a board relying in 
good faith upon a fairness opinion to determine price is protected 
from liability on this matter.252  This all provides too much weight to 
the fairness opinion.  Instead, it should be recognized for what it is:  a 
substitute and simply one factor to be used in setting price. 
An explanation for this may be the cleverness of the Delaware 
courts.  Having erected a takeover system that is not purely market-
based, retention of the fairness opinion serves as a check; it affirms 
                                                          
price.  Compare McGinty, supra note 89 (arguing for adoption of a mandatory auction 
process under Delaware law in order to maximize stockholder value in all corporate 
control transactions), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and 
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1982) (concluding that “[t]he 
available data support a no-auction rule, and the possibility of diversification all but 
ensures that investors prefer to maximize the gains from the monitoring and 
takeover process rather than to maximize the price a given target may fetch in an 
auction”).  Finally, all of this concerns a “fair” price for an acquiree—the calculus for 
an acquirer is wholly different as a market price may not be the appropriate one due 
to bidder irrationality, possible overpayment and information asymmetry.  See 
generally Black, supra note 165, at 623-34.  Caveat emptor.              
 249. Fair is a relative concept, but here a fair “price” can be defined as the highest 
price reasonably available.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  This is the 
standard set forth in Delaware for a corporate board when it initiates a change of 
control or break-up of the corporation.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
 250. In fact, the courts have readily acknowledged the opposite, justifying their 
approach due to market inefficiencies and irregularities and ostensible protection of 
unaffiliated stockholders.  See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp., 603 A.2d at 806; William T. 
Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate:   A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); Strine, supra note 245. 
 251. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 252. There is an ostensible requirement of reasonable reliance here, but the 
courts have rarely scrutinized this element.  See supra note 223 (discussing this 
failure). 
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that the ultimate paid price is within a range of values that would 
otherwise have been paid had the system been so situated.  
Alternatively, a fairness opinion confirms that a range of values is 
appropriate for a transaction agreed upon in an imperfectly-
conducted auction or other market-based mechanism.  In this role, 
the fairness opinion can act as a cure for an otherwise deficient sale 
process.  Yet, this has never been enunciated, and the Delaware 
courts have not defined “fairness” to encompass this idea.  These 
explanations also assume that fairness opinions and their underlying 
analyses can provide reliable value ranges.  Even if reliable valuation 
is possible—and I believe it is253—the better approach would arguably 
be to establish a takeover regime which produces a market-based 
price, the true price, rather than a per se procedural requirement for 
an imperfect substitute.      
D. The Academic Response 
The legal academic community has cast a limited gaze upon the 
fairness opinion, and only a handful of articles and notes have been 
written on the topic.  The majority of these pieces were published in 
the ten-year period following Van Gorkom and focused on the nature 
and scope of an investment bank’s liability for rendering a fairness 
opinion.254  However, there have been three significant law review 
articles that went beyond the liability prism; addressing the scope, 
role, and need of fairness opinions within the skein of Delaware 
takeover jurisprudence. 
In an article published in 1989, Fairness Opinions:  How Fair Are They 
and What Can be Done About It?,255 the authors, Professors Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, criticized fairness opinion practice for 
two existent, fundamental faults.  First, Professors Bebchuk and 
Kahan cited investment banker discretion inherent in the 
preparation of these opinions.256  The authors segmented this into 
“definitional” and “measurement” problems.  The “definitional” 
problem posited by the authors was the lack of any meaningful 
explanation in these opinions as to what constituted a fair price.257  
The “measurement problem” constituted embedded subjectivity in 
the valuation techniques underlying fairness opinions.258  Second, the 
                                                          
 253. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text (discussing studies supporting 
the utility of valuation). 
 254. See supra note 38 for citation of these articles. 
 255. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10. 
 256. Id. at 29-37. 
 257. Id. at 30-34. 
 258. Id. at 34-37. 
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authors asserted that the investment banks rendering these opinions 
were conflicted due to, among other reasons, their incentive-based 
fee structure and desire to maintain and initiate future client 
relationships.259 
The remedy proposed by the authors for these perceived defects 
was a judicial one keyed to each of the two faults.  First, Professors 
Bebchuk and Kahan recommended that courts should put forth 
definitions of fairness and determine the appropriate parameters and 
circumstances for each.260  The authors briefly suggested possible 
definitions for fairness in various types of corporate control 
transactions, but they did not explicate further on this point, stating 
that this was better left to the courts.261  Investment banks would then 
utilize these judicially-enunciated standards to define fairness in 
fairness opinions.262  Fairness opinions that did not so define fairness 
would be disregarded by the courts.263 
Second, Professors Bebchuk and Kahan recommended that the 
courts mitigate the “measurement problem” by “weigh[ing] an 
opinion depending on whether it states a range of fair prices and on 
the extent to which its conclusion is sensitive to its assumptions.”264  
The authors argued that this would reduce subjectivity by conveying 
more information and limiting investment bank discretion.265  More 
specifically, this would engender more exacting valuations since the 
specification of a range and the conduct of a sensitivity analysis would 
shine sunlight upon the investment banks’ valuation practices, and 
subject investment banks to the risk of reputational loss for rendering 
unreasonable opinions.266  This would restrict investment bank 
discretion in the preparation of fairness opinions since it would 
“become harder for them to make bad deals look good.”267  The 
authors, however, stated that theirs was an imperfect fix, and 
investment banks would still maintain discretion at an uncertain level, 
which could permit manipulation.  However, no other reforms in this 
arena were proposed.268 
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan then advocated for courts to 
discount fairness opinions rendered by investment banks whose fees 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 37-43. 
 260. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 46-49. 
 261. Id. at 46-47. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 47. 
 265. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 47. 
 266. Id. at 48. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 49. 
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were in any measure contingent upon the success of the related 
transaction.269  However, the authors recognized a difficulty in this 
approach for dealing with this perceived investment bank conflict.270  
The rendering of a fairness opinion in many corporate control 
transactions is ancillary to the core service of general transaction 
advice.271  The authors’ proposal would eliminate the ability of 
investment banks to charge their normal contingency fee for this 
general advice.272  The authors recognized that this would be 
impractical.273  Accordingly, the authors proposed that in such 
situations a second investment bank be retained to render the 
fairness opinion.274  The authors argued that this would reduce, if not 
eliminate, the conflict.275  This would obviously create additional 
transaction costs, but Professors Bebchuk and Kahan were not 
troubled, as these costs would be “trivial in relation to the amounts 
involved in a transaction as a whole.”276 
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan then argued that although their 
proposed remedies provided meaning and a role for fairness 
opinions the courts must nevertheless recognize the limited nature of 
fairness opinions.277  The authors stated that “as long as excessive 
judicial reliance on fairness opinions is avoided, such opinions do 
have the potential for serving a useful function.”278  Other than this 
statement, the authors did not discuss Van Gorkom’s requirements, the 
future contours of judicial reliance on fairness opinions, or the exact 
going-forward role for the fairness opinion. 
The two other articles, published in 1992, had different focuses 
and placed a far more skeptical eye on the fairness opinion.  The first 
was Charles M. Elson’s Fairness Opinions:  Are They Fair or Should We 
Care?279  The second was William J. Carney’s Fairness Opinions:  How 
Fair Are They And Why We Should Do Nothing About It.280  They each had 
sound-bite worthy titles but advocated different roles for the fairness 
opinion while repudiating Delaware’s per se fairness opinion 
requirement. 
                                                          
 269. Id. at 49-50. 
 270. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 49. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 49-50. 
 273. Id. at 50. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 50-51. 
 276. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 51. 
 277. Id. at 51-53. 
 278. Id. at 52-53. 
 279. Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10. 
 280. Carney, supra note 10. 
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Professor Elson’s article highlighted the subjectivity in the 
valuation calculations underlying a fairness opinion and the 
consequent problem of reliance.  Professor Elson traced through 
each of the valuation techniques underlying a fairness opinion and 
briefly noted the discretion inherent.281  He then explored the 
perceived conflicts in fairness opinion analyses and the potential for 
manipulation that this could engender.282  He wrote that given these 
problems, “truly objective and independent valuation advice is, as a 
practical matter, difficult to achieve.”283 
Confronting these issues, Professor Elson threw up his hands.  The 
subjectivity and conflict issues made the fairness opinion, in his 
colorful words, “as necessary to valuation analysis as is the appendix 
to the human digestive system . . . . [and] [o]ther than producing 
profits for the investment banking industry, it produces no benefit 
for the shareholders.”284  Professor Elson asserted that the market was 
the true and correct arbiter of price, and the fairness opinion was an 
unnecessary and valueless substitute.285  He argued that the Delaware 
courts should therefore repudiate Van Gorkom’s financial analysis 
requirement.286  However, Professor Elson, despite his dim view on its 
worth, was not ready to discard the fairness opinion altogether.287  
Fairness opinions would still be sought and received, since these 
opinions were, in his belief, a cheap substitute for insurance.288  This 
is because the fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction 
established needed liability protection for directors under title 8, 
section 141(e) of the Delaware Code.289  Fairness opinions would 
therefore provide boards necessary latitude in corporate control 
transactions by bestowing protections equivalent of the business 
judgment rule to their actions.290 
                                                          
 281. Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10, at 961-65. 
 282. Id. at 965-70. 
 283. Id. at 970. Professor Elson also surveyed the grounds for investment banker 
liability for rendering an incorrect fairness opinion.  Id. at 970-95.  He concluded 
that imposing negligence liability on investment bankers for inaccurate fairness 
opinions was economically ineffectual and counter-productive.  Id. at 995-1000. 
 284. Id. at 1002. 
 285. Id. at 1000-03. 
 286. Id. at 1002. 
 287. Id. at 1002-03. 
 288. Id. 
 289. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). 
 290. Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10, at 1002-03.  Professor Elson later co-
authored an article on fairness opinions wherein he appears to have revised his views 
and adopted a differing position with respect to fairness opinions.  Elson, Can They Be 
Made Useful?, supra note 6.  In this brief article, Professor Elson appears to have 
changed his opinion that fairness opinions are of little use:   the authors state that 
“we believe that properly priced fairness opinions can fulfill the function for which 
they were intended.”  Id. at 5.  The authors, however, propose two reforms be 
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Professor Carney adopted a viewpoint similar to Professor Elson’s 
with respect to the fairness opinion.  In his article, Professor Carney 
argued that the fairness opinion is a poor, formalistic substitute for 
the market and reliance on these opinions ignores how price is set in 
the market.291  Furthermore, Professor Carney asserted that a fairness 
opinion delivered to an acquiree in a corporate control transaction 
can never determinatively ascertain price, fair or otherwise.292  The 
reasoning behind this statement is that, absent inside information, an 
investment bank cannot predict the mindset and situation of the 
acquirer and therefore the ultimate price that it would be willing to 
pay.293  Accordingly, investment banks in such a situation can never 
specify a single price but can only provide a range of values.294  
Professor Carney found such a range to be of little use.295 
Consequently, Professor Carney stated that fairness opinions are a 
“costly legal tax that legal rules impose on business transactions.”296  
He posited that they “exist for two reasons; a judicial belief in the 
determinacy of value, and legal rules that shelter the business 
judgment of a board when based on reliance on the opinions of 
experts.”297  Rejecting the first rationale, he argued that insurance 
would be cheaper than the formal requirement of a fairness opinion 
he endowed with little, if any, worth.298  Ultimately, Professor Carney 
viewed the market as the gatekeeper, concluding that Van Gorkom 
should be overturned and that fairness opinions should be discarded 
as an inappropriate transaction cost.299  The informational aspect and 
protection for stockholders, if any, provided by the fairness opinion 
would be better expressed for the acquiree in the corporate control 
transaction through stockholder decisions to sell based on market 
forces and, in minority take-outs and other situations where 
                                                          
implemented in order to transform fairness opinions into more useful tools.  First, 
the authors address investment banking conflicts.  They argue that boards should 
“consider having the fairness opinion rendered by an investment bank other than 
the one receiving the success fee.” Id.  Second, the authors address the issue of 
subjective valuation.  They propose “standards to guide investment banks in their 
due diligence and pricing of transactions requiring fairness opinions.”  Id. 
 291. Carney, supra note 10, at 537-40. 
 292. Id. at 533-35. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 534. 
 295. Id. at 534-35.  Professor Carney also discussed setting liability rules for the 
rendering of fairness opinions.  He rejected setting such standards, since he believed 
that courts would be unable to craft minimum standards of care due to the 
inherently subjective nature of the valuation exercise and consequent increased 
costs.  Id. at 537. 
 296. Carney, supra note 10, at 528. 
 297. Id. at 525. 
 298. Id. at 528. 
 299. Id. at 538. 
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stockholder choice was not an effective check, through independent 
directors, appraisal remedies, and the courts.300 
IV. REFORM OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION 
This lands us at today.  Fairness opinion practices remain virtually 
unchanged since the sea shift engendered by Van Gorkom.  Since Van 
Gorkom, the Delaware courts have consistently encouraged, if not 
ostensibly required, these opinions in corporate control transactions.  
The result is continued doctrinal incoherence and redundancy in the 
Delaware takeover regime.  An instrument of questionable utility is 
per se required when market-based mechanisms would be better 
suited and more effective tools to inform board and stockholder 
decisions in corporate control transactions.  The SEC and NASD have 
also promulgated or proposed limited disclosure requirements with 
respect to fairness opinions rendered in corporate control 
transactions.301  Yet, these disclosure requirements do not effectively 
address the current deficiencies in the fairness opinion regime.  This 
Part outlines my proposals for economic and beneficial reform of the 
fairness opinion. 
A. The Fairness Opinion’s Necessity 
Given the criticism levied against the fairness opinion, intellectual 
and academic honesty requires that the merits and necessity of the 
fairness opinion be explored before proposing reform.  Professors 
Elson and Carney prefer to discard the fairness opinion.302  They view 
it as an imperfect market substitute that at best serves as a species of 
board insurance.303  Professors Bebchuk and Kahan do not address 
the issue in any substantive manner.  They assert that one should 
avoid excessive judicial reliance on these opinions, but they assume 
the utility of the fairness opinion and propose reforms to endow it 
with greater meaning.304 
So, what to do?  First, one should not lose sight of the ultimate goal 
of a corporate control transaction.  From the acquiree stockholders’ 
perspective, the goal is receipt of the highest price reasonably 
available.305  Both Professor Elson and Professor Carney correctly note 
                                                          
 300. Id. at 533-36. 
 301. See supra Parts III.A & III.B. 
 302. See supra notes 284-99 and accompanying text. 
 303. Id.  Professor Elson later argued for the adoption of standards in the 
preparation of fairness opinions.  See supra note 290. 
 304. See supra notes 255-278 and accompanying text. 
 305. This is the standard under Delaware law when a board initiates a sale of 
corporate control.  Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
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that only the market can obtain such a price with certainty.306  Upon a 
stockholder or board decision to sell, the highest price reasonably 
available can be set through an effective market-based mechanism, 
such as an open, informed, and inclusionary auction process with 
limited or no exogenous burdens and equal bidder information on 
the acquiree.307  There are other similar formulations, but if the 
corporate control transaction price is set in the foregoing manner or 
as close thereto as possible, a fairness opinion or a financial analysis 
for the acquiree board to satisfy its duty of care is unnecessary.  This 
is Van Gorkom’s downfall and Delaware courts should recognize it as 
such.  More specifically, the Delaware courts should acknowledge that 
a fairness opinion, or underlying financial analysis, is only a substitute 
for an effective market-based process to determine a “fair” price.  Van 
Gorkom’s holding should be overturned and a fairness opinion or 
financial analysis should not be required when price is determined 
through such means.308 
This does not slam the door on the fairness opinion for duty of 
care purposes.  A price in a corporate control transaction cannot 
always be set through such a market-based process.  For example, the 
posture of the transaction may not permit it.  This occurs in going-
private transactions when the acquirer has informational or other 
process-based advantages or can otherwise block interested acquirers 
through a substantial shareholding.309  Practical barriers may also bar 
                                                          
182 (Del. 1986). 
 306. See supra notes 285, 291 and accompanying text. 
 307. Of course this formulation is an impossibility to achieve in practice.  
However, the closer to this marker that one comes, the “truer” the market-based 
price.  See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers:   
A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); R. Preston McAfee & John 
McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699 (1987).   
 308.   Instead, I would argue that the Delaware courts should focus on creating a 
takeover scheme that encourages and produces such effective market-based results.  
More specifically, there should be a legal prohibition on takeover defenses and deal 
protection devices in order to facilitate a market-based takeover regime and produce 
“purer” market-based prices albeit with concomitant protections against coercive and 
other abusive practices as well as takeover rules that address information asymmetry 
and other unavoidable market inefficiencies.  The discussion of the application of my 
proposal’s implications and conclusions beyond fairness opinions is well outside the 
scope of this Article.  See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:   The 
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 878-79 (1981) 
(proposing the adoption of a tender offer rule prohibiting acquirees from taking any 
action that “could interfere with the success of the offer or result in the shareholders 
of the [acquiree] being denied the opportunity to tender their shares”). 
 309. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners, 846 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(holding that the board was not required under Delaware law to auction the 
corporation where the majority stockholder owning 61.5% of the corporation could 
have thwarted such effort); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 
1987) (holding that the board was not required under Delaware law to auction the 
corporation where the majority stockholder owning sixty-five percent of the 
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implementation of effective market-based processes.  A market-based 
mechanism such as an auction can be disruptive to the business of a 
corporation, creating uncertainty with customers, suppliers, and 
employees.310  Alternatively, corporations may not have time to 
conduct an auction process due to their own corporate difficulties.  
These two situations are noteworthy because Delaware law allows 
corporations to avoid these difficulties by choosing to be acquired 
outside of an auction process subject to a post-agreement market-
check.311  Thereafter, an auction may develop, but it will be inhibited, 
though not prevented, by deal protection devices such as break-up 
fees and non-solicits.312  Thus, in each of these two circumstances, 
price is still set in an imperfect, albeit judicially-permitted, market. 
The fairness opinion can function as a useful check and 
informational tool in these situations, informing the acquiree board 
as to the value of the corporation when a market-based mechanism is 
not available.  However, even here, the fairness opinion has inherent 
limitations.  The underlying financial analyses cannot ascertain or 
predict price.  They cannot set price since they can only provide a 
range of values that the fairness opinion can opine to as fair, utilizing 
a presumed definition of fairness.313  Additionally, given that the 
acquirer’s mindset and information are not available to the acquiree 
or to the investment bank, a fairness opinion cannot forecast the 
price an acquirer would ultimately be willing to offer, over and above 
the intrinsic value of the corporation to its current stockholders.314 
However, financial analyses can calculate a base value range of the 
acquiree’s worth.  This range can then be compared to premiums 
paid in comparable acquisitions to arrive at a takeover base price 
                                                          
corporation could have thwarted such effort). 
 310. See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. 
Ch. 2004) (holding that the board’s decision against initiating an auction was 
reasonable in light of its judgment that an auction would jeopardize the 
corporation’s workforce and allow competitors to benefit). 
 311. See supra note 67 for a discussion of the contours of a market check under 
Delaware law. 
 312. See, e.g., In re MONY Group, 852 A.2d at 24 (permitting a post-agreement 
market check with a non-solicit clause and a termination fee that amounted to 3.3% 
of the acquired corporation’s equity value and 2.4% of the total transaction value); 
In re Pennaco Energy, 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (permitting a post-
agreement market check with a non-solicit clause and a termination fee that 
amounted to three percent of the acquired corporation’s equity value). 
 313. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of 
valuation with respect to predicting and setting price). 
 314. This is primarily due to the frequent behavioral irrationality of acquirers and 
the problem of asymmetrical information.  See supra note 165.  See generally SCHILLER, 
supra note 248 (discussing aspects of investor irrationality and its effect on markets); 
ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:   AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
(2000) (describing various theories of behavioral finance and investor behavior). 
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range—a minimum auction price.  The resultant opinion has worth 
since it can inform the board in an imperfect market situation that a 
given price is fair on a base case level or by any other measure that 
defines fairness.315  However, even in these circumstances, fairness 
opinions and financial analyses are not a talismanic cure-all.  Their 
imperfections make them only one element in the total mix of 
information that an acquiree board should consider when deciding 
to engage in a corporate control transaction. 
Therefore, the Delaware courts should place value on these 
opinions to determine if a board has satisfied its duty of care in 
paradigms where an effective market-based price cannot be or is not 
obtained.316  So, for example, a fairness opinion or financial analysis 
would neither be required nor considered relevant in the duty of care 
analysis if the process followed by the acquiree board was correctly 
structured to produce a market price.  In transactions where such a 
process was not or could not be followed, a fairness opinion or 
financial analysis would be only one factor to be considered along 
with the process actually followed and the price actually produced 
relevant to the market.  The fairness opinion or financial analysis 
delivered in this context would be an indicator, but not a 
presumptive one, that the board satisfied its duty of care.317 
Here, one must consider whether the fairness opinion or the 
underlying financial analysis is more appropriate, as they are 
functional equivalents.  However, the fairness opinion is the better 
form because it distills the underlying analysis, permitting 
inexperienced directors and stockholders to point to an easily 
comprehensible statement that a transaction is fair, rather than a 
                                                          
 315. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., A ‘Fairness Letter’ is Just an Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
1986, at Section 3, 2 (arguing that fairness opinions serve an important purpose by 
informing directors of value). 
 316. The investment bank as a corporate control financial advisor to acquirees 
would not disappear under my proposals.  Investment banks provide four principal 
services to acquirees in corporate control transactions:   first, as a broker, finding and 
introducing companies that may be interested in corporate control transactions; 
second, advising on corporate control transaction processes and structure; third, 
advising on consideration by assessing stock consideration and recommending 
consideration types; and fourth, rendering a fairness opinion and providing financial 
valuation advice.  Under my proposals, there is no change to the investment bank’s 
first three roles.  In addition, investment banks would still be retained for financial 
advice, including the initial decision to sell, even if they do not render a fairness 
opinion. 
 317. The argument that boards would nonetheless seek and obtain fairness 
opinions because they shield companies from liability or serve as a form of insurance 
is discussed infra at Part IV.C.  In addition, this proposal would preserve, albeit to a 
diminished extent, the investment bank’s role as a gatekeeper in corporate control 
transactions.  See also Fiflis, supra note 35, at 513-15 (arguing for investment banks as 
gatekeepers in providing fairness opinions). 
DAVIDOFF_PRINTER 8/12/2006  2:13:10 PM 
2006] FAIRNESS OPINIONS 1615 
thirty-page board book.  In any event, I would argue that financial 
analyses that do not find a numerical range of fairness are deficient 
since they do not properly inform their recipients of the analyses’ 
actual meaning.318  So, the fairness opinion remains the lightning rod 
in my proposals and should survive as the focused instrument 
typically delivered to a board in the circumstances previously 
described. 
Now I diverge from the opinions of Professor Elson and Professor 
Carney.  Both view the market as the arbiter, even in market-
imperfect situations; for them, the fairness opinion or underlying 
financial analysis has nothing to legally add except as a form of 
insurance.319  I disagree.  I do so because I make two critical 
assumptions about fairness opinions.  First, financial analyses can 
inform as to value.320  Second, the perceived and actual conflicts of 
investment banks are not impediments to rendering worthwhile 
fairness opinions.321  However, if the fairness opinion is to have a 
useful role, it must be subject to reform.  In the next section, I discuss 
these proposals for improvement. 
B. The Fairness Opinion’s Regulation 
1. Guidelines and standards 
If fairness opinions are to have meaning, the opinion itself and the 
underlying financial analysis must be prepared in accordance with 
issued guidelines and standards and subject to supervision by a quasi-
public body, an Investment Banking Authority (the “IBA”).  The IBA, 
a guideline and standard-setting body, would serve three purposes 
with respect to fairness opinions and valuation practice.  First, the 
IBA would reduce subjectivity and investment banking discretion by 
promulgating guidelines and standards for valuation practice.  
Second, by serving as a corridor between academia and industry, the 
IBA would ensure that guidelines and standards are kept up-to-date 
and best practices are adhered to.  Finally, the IBA would supervise 
fairness opinion preparation procedures, investment bank internal 
                                                          
 318. This is arguably the case under Delaware law.  See Sutton Holding Corp. v. 
DeSoto, Inc., Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 WL 13476, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that 
the failure of the board to obtain or receive a fairness opinion with a fair value range 
was unreasonable in light of the unsolicited acquirer’s willingness to consider raising 
its offering price). 
 319. Carney, supra note 10, at 528.  See generally Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, 
supra note 6. 
 320. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text. 
 321. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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approval and vetting processes, due diligence requirements, conflicts, 
and other matters appurtenant to fairness opinions.322  The IBA 
would also be an interactive body that industry practitioners could 
consult for guidance on issues as they arise.323  I envision that this 
body would ultimately work on issues much broader than fairness 
opinions, that is, all aspects of corporate investment banking.  This 
wider supervision is, I think, sorely needed.324 
The IBA would not promulgate a strict statutory equivalent code 
that would step-by-step direct valuation practice.  This is neither 
desirable nor possible.  Rather, the IBA would issue general 
guidelines and standards for valuation practices akin to the current 
practice of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) 
in the accounting industry.325  These guidelines would outline 
acceptable valuation methodologies and procedures.  The IBA would 
also set standards and a designated course to follow to solve 
disagreements on valuation techniques.  In addition, specific 
requirements would be mandated by the IBA where necessary in 
order to prudently reduce subjective decision-making to the greatest 
extent feasible.  These guidelines and standards would go much 
farther than the limited requirements that Professors Bebchuk and 
Kahan propose.326  While the IBA would chart its own course, I 
envision that the guidelines and standards would encompass the 
following minimum requirements: 
                                                          
 322. See also Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6, at 5 (proposing the 
adoption of standards governing fairness opinion preparation); Investment Banker 
Liability:   A Panel Discussion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 557, 601-02 (1991) (panel discussion 
covering  the scope of a possible code of professional conduct for fairness opinion 
practice). 
 323. The U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the United Kingdom (the 
“Panel”) functions in this matter.  Practitioners can go before the executive office of 
the Panel and ask about the possible effects of the U.K. takeover regime on future 
transactions.  The Takeover Panel Home Page, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org. 
uk/new/.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) has a similar 
system to permit technical inquiries.  FASB Home Page, http://www.fasb.org/ 
inquiry/. 
 324. I believe this due to the many conflicting and possibly negligent practices of 
investment banks that have come to light in the post-Enron/Worldcom world.  See 
Issac Lustgarten & Jonathan C. Stapleton, Corporate Governance Reform and Financial 
Institution Intermediaries, 18 No. 2 Insights 4 (Feb. 2004) (outlining post-
Enron/Worldcom SEC enforcement actions and civil suits against investment banks 
with respect to corporate scandals and conflicts); Hillary A. Sale, Banks:   The 
Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 144-54 (2004) (outlining 
investment banks’ roles in the Enron fraud).  Of course, whether this regulation 
should come from the SEC, NASD, or an IBA is debatable.  However, an IBA would 
be able to provide directed, specific oversight and regulation of investment banks in 
a manner that a broader regulatory agency may not be able or desire to do. 
 325. For a description of the nature and role of the FASB, see Facts About FASB, 
http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission. 
 326. See generally supra notes 264-278 and accompanying text. 
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Valuation Techniques.  The IBA would establish guidelines and 
examples for appropriate and preferred valuation techniques for use 
in different valuation contexts. 
Valuation Inputs.  Where possible, the IBA would issue guidance or 
strict directives on the selection of valuation inputs.  The 
implementation of set standards should be possible in many areas of 
valuation such as the appropriate methodology for calculation of a 
discount rate, as well as the risk-free rate and market-risk rate.327 
Valuation Weight.  The IBA would put forth guidance on the weight 
to be provided to different techniques in evaluating fairness. 
Valuation Disclosure.  The IBA would issue disclosure standards for 
fairness opinions, their underlying financial analyses, and potential 
conflicts.  This would include requirements as to disclosure of 
compensation and indemnification arrangements.  These standards 
would mandate that disclosure be numerically meaningful and 
prohibit boiler-plate or cursory responses. 
Valuation Preparation.  Procedural requirements would be set forth 
by the IBA for the preparation of fairness opinions and underlying 
valuation.  This would include minimal requirements for investment 
bank fairness opinion internal review and approval procedures. 
Valuation Due Diligence.  The IBA would establish minimum 
standards concerning the scope of investment bank review of 
corporate information in the preparation of a fairness opinion. 
Fairness Opinion Form.  The IBA would issue standards for the 
fairness opinion form.  This would encompass acceptable and 
impermissible disclaimers and qualifications that could be made in 
the fairness opinion itself. 
Fairness Opinion Definition.  Fairness opinions must do more than 
just state they are fair.  Fairness should be defined and given context 
in the issuing letter.  Accordingly, the IBA would issue guidelines 
mandating this and setting forth model definitions for use in variant 
corporate control transactions. 
The IBA would not be a government-controlled body within the 
SEC or another government agency, but would be a constituency-
based, quasi-public organization akin to the FASB.328  I believe that 
this distance would increase industry buy-in to the IBA while 
                                                          
 327. See generally Campbell, supra note 70, at 45-47 (discussing possible valuation 
inputs wherein governing rules could be appropriate). 
 328. I believe that it would be better to have a stand-alone, newly-formed IBA than 
to form a branch or division of another existing entity such as the NASD.  I believe 
that this will bring focus to the organization and permit it to build an internal code 
of conduct free from pre-conceived institutional biases. 
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achieving a similar purpose.329  The officers and directors of the IBA 
could be appointed by a board of trustees, itself appointed by public 
organizations with an interest in its operation.  This is the current 
structure of the FASB,330 and it would inhibit possible industry 
capture of the IBA.  To further encourage industry buy-in, the IBA 
would not initially have the ability to impose fines or other penalties.  
However, implementation of the IBA’s directives would come by 
court fiat.  Fairness opinions that were not prepared according to IBA 
guidelines and standards would be disregarded by the courts.  In 
addition, the IBA would set an industry benchmark, which 
investment banks would ignore at their peril.331 
I realize that the investment banks would fight this proposal tooth 
and nail, but I believe that the IBA would actually benefit the 
industry.  The value of a fairness opinion would increase, and 
perhaps make them even more sought after, particularly by acquirers, 
for their informational, screening, and signaling benefits.332  The IBA 
would also make fairness opinion and valuation practices easier by 
standardizing the process.  Finally, the IBA would provide crystal 
guidelines and standards to assess appropriate investment banking 
practices and potential liability in the rendition of fairness opinions.  
This is an improvement on today’s regime where liability is uncertain 
and litigation exposure unknown due to the lack of common 
guideposts for proper fairness opinion practice and valuation 
technique.333  Alternatively, if the investment banking community 
does not act, the deep flaws in current fairness opinion practice may 
ultimately lead to scandal and reform in a measure and content that 
the investment banks cannot control and may not desire.  Acting 
beforehand upon this or similar proposals would permit investment 
banking industry participation and a say in any reform.   
                                                          
 329. This has been true of both the FASB and the Panel, which both succeeded as 
regulators while remaining quasi-public organizations. 
 330. Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index. shtml#mission. 
 331. This would occur because courts would presumably look to IBA standards as 
a touchstone to determine investment bank liability in connection with the 
rendering of fairness opinions. 
  332.  For two recent interesting and informative empirical studies of fairness 
opinions and these potential benefits, see Helen M. Bowers & William R. Latham III, 
Information Asymmetry, litigation risk, uncertainty and the demand for fairness opinions:  
Evidence from U.S. mergers and acquisitions, 1980-2002 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=626321 (finding that the probability of a 
corporation obtaining a fairness opinion is increased by asymmetric information, 
litigation risk and other transactions uncertainty measures), and Kisgen et al., supra 
note 12 (finding fairness opinions are more common in transactions where 
uncertainty and legal risk are high). 
 333. See Rubenstein, supra note 38, at 1729 (noting that “[t]he only existing 
regulation [of fairness opinions] is based on the imposition of negligence liability”). 
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The costs of the IBA would be borne by the investment banking 
industry through a mandatory membership fee or other industry-
based contribution mechanism.  The increased costs should be 
substantially outweighed by the greater utility and predictability of 
fairness opinions and valuation practices and more certain liability 
standards.  I believe that this would be true even if fairness opinions 
are not as frequently requested and are relied upon less frequently by 
the courts. 
The IBA and its issued guidelines and standards would not 
eliminate all subjectivity from fairness opinions and financial 
analyses.  However, they would create a regime of more uniform, 
predictable, and improved valuation and related investment banking 
practices.  Subjectivity would also be limited by the ability of outside 
parties to better compare and deconstruct valuations.  This and other 
improvements engendered by the IBA would increase the utility and 
reliability of the fairness opinion and its underlying valuation.  
Fairness opinions would more fully inform as to value in corporate 
control transactions, permitting more confident reliance upon them 
for determining the fairness of an offered price as well as 
informational, signaling, screening and other purposes. 
2. Disclosure 
Disclosure requirements for fairness opinions and financial 
analyses in corporate control transactions should mandate disclosure 
of all material points in any valuation underlying a fairness opinion.  
This would ensure that opining investment banks adhere to any 
guidelines and standards set by the IBA.  I define material for these 
purposes to include any subjective decision-point that could 
materially influence valuation.  A disclosure obligation keyed to this 
standard would highlight its beneficial effects on the subjective inputs 
in any valuation.  This would also place underlying financial analyses 
under greater outside scrutiny, thereby inhibiting subjectivity and use 
of out-dated or incorrect practices.  Accordingly, the argument for 
this heightened disclosure becomes stronger if my IBA proposal is 
not adopted. 
The disclosure regulation for fairness opinions promulgated by the 
SEC, NASD, and the Delaware courts, and that recommended by 
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan is accordingly insufficient in that it 
does not require disclosure at this level.334  The SEC, the primary 
                                                          
 334. See supra at Parts III.A & III.B for a discussion of the SEC and NASD 
requirements, respectively.  Delaware has a judicially-promulgated disclosure 
requirement of “a fair summary of the substantive work performed by the investment 
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regulator in this area, should remedy this defect.  In addition, the 
SEC should fix the existing discrepancy with respect to cash tender 
offers in its regulatory scheme by requiring this proposed disclosure 
for acquirees in all public corporate control transactions where a 
fairness opinion has been received and its existence is publicly 
disclosed.  To the extent that the SEC or the courts do not mandate 
such disclosure, the IBA, if it comes into existence, should implement 
such requirements. 
I justify this disclosure primarily as a check on investment banking 
and board behavior, rather than for the utility of the information.  
Retail stockholders are more likely to find meaning in market prices 
and the headline number, rather than attempt to understand 
valuation practices.  In addition, sophisticated investors tend to 
conduct their own analysis.  Here, disclosure of these inputs will aid 
their work, even if it is unlikely to change their investment decision.  
However, if investment banks are required to disclose these points, 
they will be presumably more careful and deliberate in their choices 
and, hopefully, boards, knowing this information will be disclosed, 
would probe it to a greater extent than they currently do.  This would 
ultimately benefit stockholders by increasing the quality of 
information available to board decision makers, thereby facilitating 
more informed board choices to enter into corporate control 
transactions.  Again, this is an increased need in the absence of an 
IBA and guidelines and standards. 
3. Conflicts 
There have been a number of proposed solutions to the issue 
outlined supra at Part II.C with respect to investment bank conflicts.  
The NASD and SEC have adopted a disclosure-based approach.335  
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan argue that boards should obtain a 
second fairness opinion from an independent bank that does not 
have a stake in the success of the transaction other than a fee for the 
fairness opinion.336  Neither of these fully addresses the heart of the 
                                                          
bankers upon whose advice the recommendations of their board as to how to vote on 
a merger or tender rely.”  In re Pure Resources, 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).  
The full parameters of this obligation have yet to be judicially outlined. 
 335. See supra at Parts III.A & III.B. 
 336. See generally Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6 (advocating for 
“independent directors [to] consider having the fairness opinion rendered by an 
investment bank other than the one receiving the success fee”); Mark J. Mihanovic, 
Legal Perils Mount For M&A Advisers, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Nov. 1, 2005 (stating 
that due to conflict and other issues “[t]here is good reason to believe that the trend 
toward greater use of second fairness opinions will continue”); Joan Harrison, 
Pitching Deals to Increasingly Skeptical Boards, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Aug. 1, 2005 
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conflicts issues or the current problems with fairness opinion 
practice. 
Disclosure-based solutions only partially address the issue.  
Certainly, this disclosure is worthy; boards and stockholders should 
be aware of the potential conflicts that an investment bank may have.  
This disclosure should be meaningful; boiler-plate disclosures should 
be prohibited.  It should include a requirement to disclose exact 
compensation numbers for the fairness opinion itself and for other 
“material relationships.”337  It should also include a requirement to 
disclose the exact details of any indemnification and liability-limiting 
arrangements.338  In addition, egregious practices, such as dual 
representation, should be prohibited.  However, the problem is not 
that stockholders, directors, officers, and others do not know of these 
conflicts.  They are all too aware of them.339  The problem is that 
disclosure-based solutions do not address the ultimate issue with 
these opinions; the search for meaning in an instrument that has 
underlying subjectivity, a fluid and undefined conclusion of fairness 
and that is not prepared according to best practices or any fixed set 
of disclosed guidelines and standards.  The conflicts issue is acute 
only because of the ability of potentially-conflicted investment banks 
to manipulate the process due to these failings.  If the subjectivity and 
best practices issues were addressed through the proposals made 
herein, then the conflicts problem should be manageable, albeit with 
recommended supervision by an IBA. 
                                                          
(noting that investment banks are “seeing more requests for dual fairness opinions”); 
Ann Davis & Dennis K. Berman, Checkup Prompts Search for Second Opinions, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C-1 (outlining the increased tendency of boards to seek a second 
fairness opinions).  Interestingly, in connection with its consideration of the 
regulation of going-private transactions, the SEC proposed requiring that two 
independent advisors (presumably investment banks) evaluate the consideration 
offered.  This requirement was never adopted.  See Notice of Public Fact-Finding 
Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of ‘Going-Private’ 
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
11231 [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Feb. 6, 1975). 
 337. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (highlighting the importance of 
this disclosure). 
 338. See also Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 10, at 254 (proposing that 
“[w]henever an advisor is rendering a fairness opinion under a waiver or 
indemnification of duty of care liability, specific and conspicuous disclosure of the 
waiver should . . . be presented to shareholders”). 
339. This is illustrated in the new disclosure trend by acquirees to include, 
purportedly at SEC staff request, a risk factor in their transaction documentation 
concerning contingent compensation and past relationships with their investment 
banks.  See, e.g., Supervalu Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 22-23 (Apr. 28, 
2006) (disclosing as a risk factor that “[s]ome of the financial advisors to [the 
transaction participants] have had prior business relationships with one or more of 
the parties to the transactions and are entitled to contingent fees in connection with 
the transactions”). 
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It is for these reasons that I believe the idea of a second investment 
bank is misguided.  While this double-down ameliorates the conflicts 
issue at the high cost of a second opinion, it does not deal with what I 
see as the real issues.340  Ignoring this point for the moment, the 
benefits of a second opinion are probably not worth the costs.  An 
investment bank is typically under pressure to arrive at the “right” 
outcome for the board that retained it; a bank that regularly went 
against its mandate would soon find itself with little business.  So, in 
circumstances where there is room for manipulation of the valuation, 
with no guidelines or standards, and on the edge of fairness, the bias 
will tend towards the “right” result—agreement with management—
no matter which bank is rendering the opinion, even if its purpose is 
to render independent opinions.341 
In spite of these difficulties, the idea of creating separate 
investment banks dedicated solely to rendering fairness opinions has 
also been intermittently proposed.342  However, this does not appear 
to be the answer either.  First, corporations generally require and 
desire the general financial advice that investment banks provide.  So, 
again, as even Professors Bebchuk and Kahan recognize, two 
investment banks would need to be retained, thereby alleviating the 
conflict issue, but creating additional transaction costs.343  Second, 
investment banks that regularly refused to render fairness opinions 
would soon find themselves with little business.  I find no significant 
purchase in the possible contrary argument that a market in quality 
would develop whereby fairness opinions delivered by such banks 
would be highly valued and sought after.  My rationale is this:  I see 
no incentive or desire, legal or otherwise, in today’s market for this 
development.  There is also little value in creating such incentives 
due to the high transaction costs of a second investment bank.  
Again, this would be a misdirected solution. 
Ultimately, though, it is only on the edges where these conflict 
issues typically arise.  Even in today’s fairness opinion regime, a bank 
has substantial reputation and even liability risks that limit its ability 
                                                          
 340. It can also be argued that the utilization of a second investment bank for a 
fairness opinion deprives the corporation and its stockholders’ of the financial 
advisor who understands the finances of the corporation and therefore is in a better 
position to render an opinion as to fairness.  I agree with this argument in the 
presence of fairness opinion guidelines and standards. 
 341. See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text for a discussion of investment 
bank reputational incentives with respect to fairness opinion practices. 
 342. See Morgenson, supra note 149 (reporting on a newly formed investment 
bank organized solely to render fairness opinions, but not provide financial advice, 
in order to stem potential conflicts). 
 343. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 49-51. 
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to fudge a fairness opinion.  These impetuses are reinforced by the 
review procedures in place at each investment bank.  They can be 
further restricted through more exacting valuation practice and 
fairness opinion procedures combined with heightened disclosure 
standards implemented through the IBA.  A recent study by 
Professors Charles W. Calomiris and Donna M. Hitscherich, provides 
support for this position.344  The authors analyzed fairness opinion 
fees in friendly, cash tender offers from 1994-2002 and concluded 
that there was no statistically significant difference in acquisition 
premia when the fairness opinion fee was fixed rather than 
contingent.345  The authors therefore concluded that there was no 
evidence that “investment banks are suborned by acquirers with 
whom they have had a prior banking relationship.”346 
C. The Fairness Opinion’s Insurance Aspect 
If fairness opinions are no longer a per se requirement under the 
proposals set forth herein, it could be argued that they would still be 
regularly sought and obtained by boards due to the inoculating effect 
of title 8, section 141(e) of the Delaware Code.347  This is the 
insurance justification put forth by both Professor Elson and 
Professor Carney.348  However, as a practical matter under Delaware 
law, this belief overlooks the effect of another provision of the 
Delaware Code.  Post-Van Gorkom, Delaware adopted title 8, section 
102(b)(7),349 which permits a Delaware corporation to, in its 
certificate of incorporation, relieve its directors en toto from monetary 
                                                          
 344. Charles W. Calomiris & Donna M. Hitscherich, Banker Fees and Acquisition 
Premia for Targets in Cash Tender Offers:   Challenges to the Popular Wisdom on Banker 
Conflicts (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=708222. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 31.  But see In re Tele-Communications, Inc., 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 
(stating that “[a] contingently paid and possibly interested financial advisor might be 
more convenient and cheaper absent a deal, but its potentially misguided 
recommendations could result in even higher costs . . . .”); Kisgen et al., supra note 
12, at 25 (empirical study finding that, in the case of acquirers, when the investment 
bank advisor receives a contingent advisory fee acquirers have lower post-
announcement period returns). 
 347. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (outlining the protections 
afforded by a fairness opinion for purposes of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)). 
 348. See supra notes 288-300 and accompanying text. 
 349. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).  This provision was adopted in the 
wake of Van Gorkom to alleviate vocal concerns by corporations that their directors 
would now be subject to increased liability exposure and that director’ insurance 
premiums would consequently increase because of Van Gorkom’s holding.  See Tamar 
Lewin, Delaware Law Allows Less Director Liability, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986, at D1; see 
also Stephen A. Radin, Director Protection Statutes after Malpiede and Emerald Partners, 
16 No. 2 INSIGHTS 10 (Feb. 2002) (discussing grounds and procedural mechanisms 
for directors to assert a defense under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001)). 
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liability for breach of their duty of care.350  Almost every publicly 
traded corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware 
has opted into this provision.351  For directors of these corporations, a 
fairness opinion and the cloak of title 8, section 141(e) do not 
provide them any further substantive protection.  Likewise, Professor 
Elson and Professor Carney’s arguments that a fairness opinion 
alleviates liability concern and establishes equivalent protections of 
the business judgment rule do not have significant persuasion. 
There is still some protection that a fairness opinion does provide 
in cases where title 8, section 102(b)(7) is applicable.  A fairness 
opinion establishes a defense under title 8, section 141(e) from a suit 
that seeks equitable relief premised upon a breach of the board’s 
duty of care.352  However, if the proposals put forth herein were 
adopted, fairness opinions would not be required implicitly or 
otherwise nor would they provide persuasive or definitive evidence of 
satisfaction of either the duty of care or fairness itself.  Depending 
upon the circumstances of the corporate control transaction, they 
would be only one factor to be considered, if at all, by the Delaware 
courts.  A Delaware court considering whether to apply the 
prophylactic protections of title 8, section 141(e) should therefore 
adopt the same analysis.  This would better comport with the true 
nature and role a fairness opinion has in informing the board in a 
corporate control transaction. 
This leads to a cost-benefit component of this scrutiny, which is 
applicable whether or not the proposals made herein are fully 
implemented.353  In all of these circumstances, the board should 
assess the costs of the fairness opinion, the legal, informational and 
                                                          
 350. See In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 15779-NC, 2001 WL 
755133, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stating that the exculpatory provision in certificate of 
incorporation “authorized by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), generally shields 
directors from monetary liability for a breach of their duty of due care”). 
 351. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 
477, 490 (2000) (finding that “[c]harter provision enabling statutes like Delaware’s 
Del. Code tit. 8 section 102(b)(7), moreover, have been almost universally 
implemented by corporations to which such laws apply”); see also Michael Bradley & 
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 62 (1989) (stating that of a sample of 593 public firms “it appears that 
94% (559/593) of Delaware firms amended their articles of incorporation in 
accordance with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 8, 102(b)(7)”). 
 352. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 985 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (rejecting the “allegation that the director defendants ‘breached their 
fiduciary duties’ by approving an allegedly defective [fairness] opinion” on the basis 
that it was barred by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)). 
 353. In this regard, it is interesting to note that one empirical study conducted 
after Van Gorkom concluded that the value of Delaware firms fell significantly around 
the time of the enactment of Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  Bradley & Schipani, supra 
note 351, at 74. 
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other benefits that it can bestow, and the feasibility of other 
alternative measures.  In order to facilitate this choice, SEC or IBA 
disclosure requirements should mandate that the amount of an 
investment bank’s fee that is allocable to a fairness opinion, even if 
contingent, should be separately disclosed from any other fees.  This 
will permit companies to assess the need for a fairness opinion and its 
relative value and for stockholders to be able to critique this decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Fairness opinions are complicated beasts that are given high regard 
by Delaware courts, and have a central, virtually mandatory role in 
the corporate control transaction.  This reliance is not currently 
justified.  Fairness opinions and underlying valuation practices are 
problematic.  They are prone to subjectivity and prepared by 
investment banks that are conflicted and who do not follow optimal 
valuation methodologies.  Absent these issues, fairness opinions are 
an imperfect substitute for a price engendered by an effective market-
based mechanism.  Accordingly, fairness opinions in corporate 
control transactions should not be required by the Delaware courts, 
implicitly or otherwise, nor should they provide persuasive or 
definitive evidence of satisfaction of either a board’s duty of care or 
the fairness of a transaction.  Rather, fairness opinions should be only 
one factor, if at all, for the courts to consider in their analysis of an 
acquiree board’s satisfaction of its duty of care in the corporate 
control transaction decision.  This more limited role for fairness 
opinions is desirable only if fairness opinions are subject to 
preparatory guidelines and standards, more fulsome disclosure 
requirements, and limitations on egregious, conflicted practices.  
These new strictures should be administered by a new, quasi-public 
IBA.  If these reforms are implemented, fairness opinions and their 
underlying valuation analyses can become valuable instruments for 
boards and stockholders considering a price offered or to be paid in 
a corporate control transaction.  This is particularly so if there is no 
effective market-based process available to establish price.  As an 
added bonus, the adoption of these reforms should significantly 
alleviate the often-cited problem of investment bank conflicts in the 
provision of fairness opinions. 
* * * 
